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DEFERRING TO SECRECY
MARGARET

B.

KWoKA*

Abstract: In prescribing de novo judicial review of agencies' decisions to
withhold requested information from the public under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), Congress deliberately and radically departed
from the typical deferential treatment courts are required to give to agencies. Nonetheless, empirical studies demonstrate that the de novo review
standard on the books in FOIA cases is not the standard used in practice.
In fact, despite being subject to the stringent de novo standard, agencies'
FOIA decisions are upheld at a substantially higher rate than agency decisions that are entitled to deferential review. This Article posits that although courts recite the appropriate standard in FOIA cases, they have
created a collection of practices unique to FOIA cases that have the effect
of deferring to the government's secrecy positions. First, in some cases,
courts expressly defer to particular representations made by the government, even though these representations are themselves crucial to the
overall determination of the legality of the withholding. Second, in every
FOIA case, certain procedural practices have become part of the body of
case law governing how FOIA cases are adjudicated, and these practices
stack the deck in favor of the government. This Article concludes that
these procedural practices, which are departures from the federal procedural system's trans-substantive design, may be the more pernicious of the
deference doctrines under FOIA, as they hide the true nature of the rulings, make it more difficult for the political branches to respond, and diminish public confidence in the judiciary.
INTRODUCTION

Administrative agencies are charged with carrying out the vast majority of business of the federal government. Their activities range from
promulgating regulations,' to adjudicating individual claims for bene* @ 2013, Margaret B. Kwoka, Assistant Professor, John Marshall Law School; J.D.,
Northeastern University School of Law; A.B., Brown University. I owe special thanks to the
Southeastern Association of Law Schools New Scholars Workshop and the Chicago Junior
Scholars Workshop, where I presented versions of this paper. I am also deeply grateful to
Stuart Ford, C6sar Cuauht6moc Garcia HernAndez, Kara Hatfield, Michael Hernindez,
David Levine, and Brian Wolfman for their helpful comments on earlier drafts, and to
Melissa Darr, Matthew Gran, Fang Han, and Lyndsay Ignasiak for their excellent research
assistance.
I See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (explaining procedures for
agency rulemaking).
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fits,2 to providing public works and services, 3 to licensing the rights to
engage in various activities, 4 and beyond. Almost every agency decision
affects the public in some perceptible way. As a result, the legitimacy,
correctness, and lawfulness of nearly every agency action has the potential to be the subject of a lawsuit.
Despite the availability of judicial review for most agency decisions,
almost all agency actions are entitled to deference from the courts.5
Rationales for deference to agency actions include agency expertise in
the subject matter of the decision, a desire to avoid courts duplicating
the efforts of the agency, and the concern, rooted in the separation of
powers, that courts not unduly interfere with the political branches of
government.6 Moreover, deference to the agencies is not limited to
their findings of fact; unlike appellate review of trial court decisions
that do not arise from agencies, courts reviewing agency actions typically defer to the agency's position even on questions of law.7
In stark contrast to the vast majority of standards of judicial review
applied in administrative law, judges are required to exercise de novo
review over agency decisions to withhold government records under
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).8 The legislative histories of
the standards of review articulated in FOLA and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) demonstrate that Congress acted deliberately.9 As
one scholar put it, "It is doubtful that Congress wants scope of review to
be an irrelevant labeling exercise."10 A FOIA withholding is different
from other agency actions in important ways: it is one of the few administrative actions in which the agency's own illegitimate self-interest is
often at stake, it is uniquely about the public's oversight right over the

2 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 421(b) (2006) (providing for a hearing before the Social Security
Administration regarding entitlement to social security disability benefits).
3 The services offered by government are too numerous to catalog reasonably, but they
include, of course, national security, public works projects, subsidies, and many more. See
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT (2012).
4 For example, the Federal Communications Commission licenses the rights to broadcast television and radio stations. See Licensing, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, http://www.fcc.
gov/topic/licensing (last visitedJan. 11, 2013).
5 See infra notes 25-50 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 51-78 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 25-50 and accompanying text.
8 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (B) (2006).
9 See infra notes 79-105 and accompanying text.
10Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 679, 682 (2002).
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administrative state, and Congress intended judges to act as protectors
of the public interest."
Despite Congress's clear intentions, commentators have observed
that judicial review of agency FOIA decisions is less than vigorous.12
Most notably, Professor Paul Verkuil's empirical study suggests that
FOIA requesters who challenge denials in court fail to get the benefit
of the searching review provided for by Congress.13 He reports a ninety
percent affirmance rate in FOIA cases, which is higher than the affirmance rate for comparable administrative decisions supposedly reviewed with greater deference.14 Verkuil labels judicial review of FOIA
decisions "anemic," and attributes this outcome to a "black box of inarticulate factors" that influence courts' decision making. 5
Others have suggested various subjective motives that might underlie judicial decisions in this area, including hostility to FOIA as a
transparency tool, unsympathetic plaintiffs, and overconfidence in the
government's assessments of harms associated with releasing documents such as those related to national security.16 Rather than probe
judges' subjective intentions or motivations, this Article theorizes a system of judicial practices that amount to deferential treatment and account for the astronomical affirmance rate, and in so doing, fills in a
portion of the "black box" of judicial decision making in FOIA cases.
This Article posits that, contrary to Congress's purpose, the judiciary
See infra notes 106-119 and accompanying text.
See generally Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role That Courts Should Play in Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 ADmIN. L. REv. 131 (2006) (arguing that courts overly defer
to agencies' national security claims); Verkuil, supra note 10 (evaluating the affirmance
rate in FOLA cases, reviewed under a de novo standard, as compared with the affirmance
rate in Social Security disability cases, which are reviewed under a deferential standard);
Nathan Slegers, Comment, De Novo Review Under the Freedom of Information Act: The Case
AgainstJudicialDeference to Agency Decisions to Withhold Information, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 209
(2006) (noting various instances in which courts expressly depart from the de novo standard of review prescribed in the statute).
13 Verkuil, supra note 10, at 730. As Verktiil states, "The challenge is to make district
judges more curious about these cases so that they might look behind agency affidavits." Id.
14 Id. at 706, 713 (reporting an approximately ten percent reversal rate in FOIA cases
during the ten-year period from 1990 to 1999, which was "closer to the hypothesized arbitrary and capricious standard" and fell far below the over fifty percent reversal rate in Social Security disability cases).
15 Id. at 718.
16 See, e.g., Fuchs, supra note 12, at 163 (describing courts' reluctance "to probe agency
explanations" for withholding national security information); James T. O'Reilly, "Access to
Records" Versus "Access to Evil:" Should Disclosure Laws ConsiderMotives as a Barrierto Records
Release?, 12 KAN.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 559, 567 (2003) (arguing that the particular requester's
motives factor into judicial decision making about release); Verkuil, supra note 10, at 71516 (citing courts' "skepticism" toward FOIA, if not "resistance").
11
12
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has created a de facto system of deference in its judicial review of FOIA
cases, while continuing to pay lip service to the de novo standard of
review articulated in the statute. This deference is two-pronged. First, in
some instances, the judiciary expressly has adopted doctrines of deference for particular types of secrecy decisions, not rooted in statutory or
other authority, based on its own view of the correct decisionmaker in a
given context.' 7 Second, courts have adopted procedural maneuvers
unique to FOIA cases that frustrate challenges to agencies' secrecy decisions.' 8
Part I demonstrates that Congress made a deliberate and reasoned
choice to require courts to engage in a more critical review of FOIA decisions than other agency actions.19 Part II surveys the empirical evidence on the effect of the standard of review on the outcomes of administrative cases.20 It documents that FOIA's affirmance rate is an outlier
that cannot be explained by existing theories of litigation outcomes. 21
Part III explains the gap between FOIA's stringent standard of review
and high affirmance rate by theorizing a system of substantive and procedural deference that results in approval of agency secrecy decisions in
FOIA cases. 22 Part IV argues that not only is the courts' failure to respect
the congressionally chosen standard of review troubling, but also that
the courts' use of procedural devices to achieve that outcome poses particular problems for judicial transparency, public response, and the
courts' legitimacy.2 3 Finally, Part V concludes by providing potential responses to the courts' deference to secrecy. 24

I.

PURPOSEFUL CONGRESSIONAL CHOICE

A. Standardsof Review ofAgency Actions
Judicial review of most agency actions is governed by the APA. 25
Although statutes specific to agencies or particular agency factions may
provide otherwise, 26 the APA establishes default judicial review stan17 See infra notes 168-223 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 224-313 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 25-119 and accompanying text.

20 See infra notes 120-165 and accompanying text.
21See infra notes 120-165 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 166-313 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 314-340 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 341-353 and accompanying text.
25 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2006).
26 See, e.g., Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents,89 TEx. L.
REv. 499, 507-09 (2011).
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dards providing that courts may review agency actions and set aside any
findings or conclusions that are:
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or
immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject
to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on
the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts
are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.27
These seemingly straightforward standards have produced more confusion than clarity,28 and determining how to apply these standards of
review has generated lengthy and hair-splitting decisions. 2 9
The default standards operate differently depending on whether
the question before the court is one of fact, law, or discretion.30 By way
of comparison, in the context of appellate review of trial court (rather
than agency) decisions, facts found by a district court are reviewed for
clear error by a court of appeals, discretionary decisions are reviewed
for an abuse of that discretion, and legal questions are reviewed de

U.S.C. § 706.
David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REv. 135, 153 (2010).
2 See David Zaring, Rule by Reasonableness, 63 ADMIN. L. REv. 525, 530 (2011) (noting
that it has "never been easy for courts to distinguish between questions of law, questions of
fact, and mixed questions of law and fact, subsequently apply the right standard of review,
and then finally perform a catchall review for arbitrariness").
3 As I describe the various standards that apply, I attempt only to describe the formal
standards and their basic applications to show that the vast majority of administrative decisions are reviewed deferentially. I do not contend that all of these standards are different
from one another in practice. Nor do I contend that these standards are clear in their
application or justified either by the APA or administrative common law. I note only that
the literature raises serious doubts about all of those questions. See, e.g., Jack M. Beerman,
End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should
Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REv. 779, 782-84 (2010) (arguing that the judicial standard of
deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, stemming from the 1984 Sitpreme Court case, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, is unjustified, has unduly complicated judicial review, and has failed to effectuate its purpose); Zaring, supra note 28, at 166-67 (positing that the differing standards, in practice, amount to the same level of review).
27 5

28 See
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novo.31 These familiar standards are founded on the precept that the
district court is in the best position to view the evidence, find facts, and
employ the most just exercise of discretion, whereas courts of appeals
specialize in answering legal questions and unifying the law.32 As a result, appellate courts do not defer to trial courts on questions of law,
but they do review findings of fact and discretionary decisions under
these deferential standards.
Although agencies face tasks analogous to those of district courts,
appellate courts reviewing agency decisions treat agency decisions differently. First, these familiar standards are inapplicable to judicial review of agency actions. Rather, the usual division between factual and
discretionary decisions as the province of the initial decisionmaker, on
the one hand, and legal questions as the province of the reviewing
body, on the other, itself breaks down. Instead, in the agency context,
some type of deference applies in almost all circumstances.
To begin, in reviewing formal agency proceedings subject to triallike procedures under the APA, courts review findings of fact using the
"substantial evidence" standard.3 3 Factual findings made in informal
proceedings are reviewed under the APA's "arbitrary or capricious"
standard. 34 Both of these standards are highly deferential. The U.S. Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence review as equivalent to
an inquiry into whether there was sufficient evidence to support a jury
verdict,35 a notoriously deferential standard. Similarly, it has declared
that arbitrary and capricious review is ultimately a narrow review.36
Many lower courts, including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit,3 7 have concluded that the two standards are identical.38 As in
31 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see
also FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (6) ("Findings of fact ... must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.").
3 See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436, 440 (2001)
(noting that the purpose of de novo review is to allow appellate courts "to maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal principles" (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,
697 (1996))); id. at 440 (observing that standards of review may turn on considerations of
"institutional competence").
3 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (E) (2006); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477

(1951).
34 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
3 Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 477.

Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).

Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 745
F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
38 See Zaring, supra note 28, at 166-67 (collecting cases). This view is shared by many
academics. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles &SCass R. Sunstein, The Real World of ArbitrarinessReview, 75 U. Ci. L. REv. 761, 764 (2008) (suggesting that there is no difference between
36
3
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appellate review, initial factual findings are therefore given great deference in administrative review.
The APA also requires deference in reviewing agencies' discretionary decisions. The APA allows a court to set aside agency actions that
are "arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion,"3 9 a standard that
has been interpreted as an overarching requirement applying to all
kinds of agency action, including discretionary decisions. 40 Even in the
Supreme Court's decision requiring courts to examine a detailed list of
facets of an agency's discretionary action, the Court acknowledged that
the standard is "narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for
that of the agency."41
As to legal interpretations, some agency determinations are completely unreviewable under the APA, either because Congress vested an
agency with complete, unbounded discretion or because Congress specifically abolished review by statute. 42 A complete lack of review is, of
course, ultimate deference, as no agency decision can be overturned if
review is unavailable.4 3 Beyond unreviewable decisions, most of an
agency's reviewable legal interpretations also get deferential review under judicially created doctrines. So-called "Chevron deference," requiring
courts to uphold reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, applies when agencies create binding interpretive rules implementing statutes they administer (the bulk of the statutes they interpret).44 Agencies interpreting those statutes in guidelines or informal
the arbitrary and capricious standard and the substantial evidence test); Note, Rationalizing
Hard Look Review After theFact, 122 HARv. L. REV. 1909, 1910 & n.6 (2009) (contending that
the arbitrary and capricious and substantial evidence standards have been applied nearly
identically).
39 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006).
40 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-44
(1983).
41 Id. at 43.

4 See 5 U.S.C. § 701 (a) ("This chapter applies ... except to the extent that-(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by
law."); Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410 (describing matters as committed to agency discretion
when "statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply"); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830-32 (1985) (holding that an agency's
refusal to take enforcement action is ordinarily committed to agency discretion).
4 SeeVerkuil, supra note 10, at 689 (hypothesizing the affirmance rate of cases not subject to judicial review as 100 percent).
44 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984). This standard, known as "Step Two," is only reached if Congress's intent on the
precise question is not ascertainable after "employing the traditional tools of statutory
construction" to determine the statute's clear meaning. Id. at 843 n.9; see Elizabeth V.
Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration:How Chevron Misconceives the Function
ofAgencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REv. 673, 702-11 (2007). Professor Peter Strauss
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policies are likewise entitled to deference, under the nominally-lessdeferential (but still not de novo) "Skidmore deference," in which a court
should defer if it finds the agency's rationale persuasive.45 Finally, an
agency interpreting its own regulation is entitled to "Auer deference,"
under which an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous regulation is
controlling unless "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." 46
In contrast to the pervasive deferential standards that apply to almost every conceivable type of agency action (albeit with varying articulations), de novo review is exceedingly rare.4 7 It does, however, have
some limited applications in administrative review. For example, the
APA itself contemplates unusual situations under which de novo review
applies, such as when the agency's findings of fact were inadequate. 48 In
addition, under the terms of Chevron, de novo review applies to an
agency's interpretation of the APA, the U.S. Constitution, or a statute it

has reconceptualized Chevron deference as "Chevron space," connoting an "area within
which an administrative agency has been statutorily empowered to act" with judges performing the function of referees ensuring the agency stays within those bounds rather
than deciding what the agency should do within them. Peter L. Strauss, "Deference" Is Too
Confusing-Let's Call Them 'Chevron Space" and 'Skidmore Weight," 112 COLUM. L. REV.
1143, 1145 (2012).
4 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234-35 (2001) (noting that Skidmore
held that informal agency interpretations such as letter rulings may merit some deference); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) ("The weight of [an agency's]
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control."). There
are competing views on whether Skidmore deference is really any deference at all. Professor
Colin Diver has argued that the "'weight' assigned to any advocate's position is presumably
dependent upon" the factors outlined in Skidmore, and he has concluded that "[d]eference
in this sense is no more than 'courteous regard.'" Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in
the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 565 (1985) (discussing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at
140). Recent empirical work, however, supports the notion that Skidmore deference has a
more practical and deferential effect than Diver's conceptualization would predict. See
Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107
COLUM. L. REv. 1235, 1250-52, 1259 (2007); see also Strauss, supra note 44, at 1145 (arguing for Skidmore deference to be thought of instead as "Skidmore weight," a term that more
accurately reflects courts' treatment of agency positions).
4 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)).
4 Zaring, supra note 28, at 136, 160 (concluding that although "[s]ummarizing the
doctrine of judicial review in administrative law is no easy task," de novo review is not at
"the heart of administrative law").
- See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (F) (2006) (encompassing situations where fact-finding by the
agency was inadequate and providing for de novo trial).

HeinOnline -- 54 B.C. L. Rev. 192 2013

2013]

Deferringto Agency Secrecy and WithholdingDecisions UnderFOIA

193

does not administer.49 Thus, although some agency actions are reviewed de novo, deference to agency decisions is the norm.50
B. Origins ofDeference to Agencies
Although the deference afforded to agencies' legal interpretations
is largely a creature of judicial doctrines, most of the deference courts
give to agency decisions comes from Congress's choices made in enacting the APA. 51 Specifically, the text of the APA mandates deference to
agencies' factual findings and discretionary decisions. 52 The legislative
history reveals that although the APA was enacted precisely to check
the growing power wielded by the administrative state, no serious proposal for administrative reform ever contained a powerful provision for
a default de novo standard ofjudicial review. To the contrary, Congress
intentionally created standards of review obligating judges to defer to
most agency positions.5 3
The APA came about largely as a reaction to the expanding administrative state during the New Deal.54 The urgency for action regarding
administrative procedure peaked in the late 1930s, primarily as a result
of two events. First, before 1937, opponents of the New Deal could rely
on the Supreme Court to routinely strike down President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's programs.55 In 1937, however, the Court performed an
4 See Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 137 n.9 (1997); Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932). For instance, any federal agency may be called upon to interpret
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which applies to all federal agencies. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(a) (2006).
5o Notably, Professor David Zaring has recently argued that the various standards under which agency actions are reviewed all amount to a version of a "reasonableness" standard and that under any standard of review, agency actions are upheld about two-thirds of
the time. Zaring, supra note 28, at 137; see also infra notes 159-165 and accompanying text
(describing Zaring's argument in more detail).
51 See 5 U.S.C. § 706. Although Chevron was a judicially created doctrine, Congress was
aware of the direction courts were taking in deferring to agencies on questions of law and
in 1981 considered, but did not pass, a law that would have encouraged courts to afford
less deference to agencies on legal questions. See generally Ronald M. Levin, Review of "Jwisdictional"Issues Under the Bumpers Amendment, 1983 DUKE L.J. 355 (discussing the proposed
Bumpers Amendment).
52 See 5 U.S.C. § 706. In addition, the APA mandates deference on legal questions to
the extent that it provides for circumstances in which no review is available, which is an
ultimate form of deference. See id. § 702.
53 See infra notes 79-105 and accompanying text.
54 See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges
from New DealPolitics, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1557, 1559 (1996).
55Id. at 1568-69 (documenting the lack of legislative will to pass early proposals for
administrative reform, such as the 1933 bill introduced by Senator Marvel Mills Logan).
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about-face on the New Deal programs, upholding the federal government's power to enact program after program.5 6 Accordingly, administrative reform became the primary way in which New Deal programs
could be checked.5 7 Second, the European dictators' growing power at
the time fueled concerns about communist and totalitarian regimes
and their potential threat to American democracy.58 The growth of the
administrative state was seen by some as antidemocratic and anticapitalist. For instance, an American Bar Association report decried "unfettered discretion to administrative agencies [as] 'a Marxian idea,"'59 and
one member of Congress argued that "[w]hen we allow Government
bureaus to make rules that are tantamount to laws, and then permit no
appeal from them, we are rapidly approaching the totalitarian state."6 0
In sum, the routine survival of New Deal programs against court challenges and the fear that New Deal programs portended anticapitalist
dictatorship made administrative reform a legislative priority.
In particular, judicial review of agency actions was seen as the ultimate check on the growing administrative state, and questions of scope
of review became a central part of the debate. As described by one
scholar, Senator Marvel Mills Logan, the proponent of an administrative procedure bill that nearly became law (it was passed by Congress in
1940 but was vetoed by President Roosevelt), explained that the "purpose [of the bill] was to enlarge the availability of judicial review of
agency decisions." 61 That bill put forth some of the strongest agency
controls ever proposed62 and was viewed as a direct attack on the New

56 Although known as the "switch in time that saved nine," one scholar has noted that
Justice Owen Roberts switched his vote on the first of these cases before the court-packing
plan had been announced, probably in response to President Roosevelt's electoral victory
in 1936 and broad popular support for his programs, as well as legislative efforts to curtail
the Court's judicial review powers. Id. at 1563; see W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937).
57 Shepherd, supra note 54, at 1563-64 (observing that once the Supreme Court endorsed the New Deal programs, opponents of the New Deal turned to Congress to restrain
the administrative state).
58 Id. at 1581, 1593.
59 Id. at 1591 (citing Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 A.B.A. ANN.
REP. 340 (1938)). President Roosevelt himself felt the need to respond to critics who
viewed his growing power as akin to Adolf Hitler-he publicly stated, "I have no inclination to be a dictator." Id. at 1581.
60 See id. at 1610 (quoting 86 CONG. REc. 4534 (1940) (statement of Rep. Michener)).
61 Id. at 1602, 1632.
62 For a graphic representation of the strength of the protections for individuals
against the administrative state, see id. at 1619-20.
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Deal.63 Critics claimed that the bill would "tie up administrative agencies so completely that they would never get a chance to get any of their
work done,"6 and that it would allow 'judges [to] substitute their views
for those of the administrative officers." 65 Yet even the most aggressive
versions of the bill provided for deferential judicial review of agency
actions; 6 6 de novo review was never on the table.67
After multiple attempts to pass an administrative procedure reform bill failed, Congress temporarily abandoned the project with the
outbreak of World War 11.68 The war itself, however, had the unanticipated consequence of arousing substantial public objection to the vast
administrative state, as the public blamed war agencies for many of the
inefficiencies and unfairness of wartime society.69 Consequently, administrative reform was at the top of the legislative agenda when the
new Congress opened in early 1945.70 After some public debate, negotiations among Congress, agencies, and the Roosevelt and Truman administrations were conducted behind closed doors.7 1 These negotiations led to the bill that eventually became the APA.
The official legislative history, consciously scant because of the
backdoor nature of the compromise that led to the APA's passage,7 2
nonetheless explains that the judicial review provision of the APA was
designed to "preserve []" the "basic exception of administrative discretion."73 It carried out this purpose by codifying the "substantial evidence" standard that had been used by the courts to review agency fact-

63 Shepherd, supra note 54, at 1610. Particular programs and agencies, such as the National Labor Relations Board, were seen as primary targets. Id.
6 Id. at 1600 (quoting 86 CONG. REc. 4654 (statement of Rep. Edelstein)).
65 Id. at 1605 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1149, at 3 (1940)).
66 For instance, the version of the bill originally passed by the House of Representatives allowed review of factual findings by agencies under the "clearly erroneous" standard,
and the Senate struck that provision. See id. at 1621.
67 The closest anyone might have come was an American Bar Association (ABA) proposal to permit a court to review evidence under the "preponderance of the evidence"
standard, but that proposal was abandoned, even by the ABA. Id. at 1660.
68 Id. at 1641.
69 Shepherd, supra note 54, at 1642-43. In particular, the public challenged the Office
of Price Administration and the Office of War Mobilization, which consumers and farmers
criticized for failing to control inflation, problems with rationing and the unavailability of
products, and issues with price controls. Id. at 1641-42.
7o See id. at 1654.
71 Id. at 1661, 1655.
72 Id. at 1663.
7 Administrative Procedure: HearingsBefore the H. Conm. on the Judiciary, 79th Cong. 84
(1945) (statement of Carl McFarland, Chairman, ABA Special Comm. on Admin. Law).
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finding.74 Even those who complained that courts' application of the
substantial evidence standard amounted to a rubber stamp on agency
decisions did not propose de novo review.75 Rather, competing proposals (ultimately rejected) would have mandated review that upheld
agency action only if it was supported by the weight or preponderance
of the evidence.7 6 It was always intended, as the bill's Senate Report
stated, that "[i]n the first instance . . . it [would] be the function of the
agency to determine the sufficiency of the evidence upon which it
acts."77 The Report also suggested that it did not intend for the bill to
"result in some undue impairment of a particular administrative function." 78
The legislative history thus demonstrates that despite a decade-long
fight for administrative reform that would entail meaningful judicial
review as a check on the growing administrative state, no serious proposal ever suggested that a default de novo review standard apply to all
agency decisions. Despite concerns about the New Deal, President Roosevelt's amassing of power, and the growing fear of totalitarianism itself,
judicial review was meant to be deferential to the agencies. This deference seems built into the idea of a useful administrative state, which
would be undermined if the judiciary fully replicated all agency efforts.
C. FOIA's De Novo Break from History
FOIA's judicial review provision parts ways with the default standards of review of agency actions. First, FOIA's judicial review provision
expressly rejects the deferential treatment the APA mandates to agencies' factual and discretionary determinations.79 Second, FOIA's legislative history reveals Congress's very different concerns regarding the
need for judicial review under FOIA than under the APA.so

7

Id.

See id. (statement of Rep. Hatton W. Sumners, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (noting concern that under the substantial evidence standard, "courts look around to
see if there is any sort of evidence to support the determination of the agency and, if it
does find some evidence to support the determination of the agency, the determination of
the agency is upheld").
76 See id. (suggesting instead that the courts "ought to consider the whole field and
weight of the evidence"). This standard is akin to the standard used by district courts to
grant a new trial. See FED. R. Civ. P. 59.
7 See S. REP. No. 79-752, at 216-17 (1945).
7

78 Id.

5 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (4) (B) (2006).
so See infra notes 81-105 and accompanying text.
7
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As originally enacted, the APA included a public information access provision, which provided, in its entirety: "Save as otherwise required by statute, matters of official record shall in accordance with
published rule be made available to persons properly and directly concerned except information held confidential for good cause found."81
This provision, however, proved to function more as a "withholding
[statute] than as a disclosure statute," and was "cited as statutory authority for the withholding of virtually any piece of information" that
an agency did not want to disclose.8 2 In addition, the law provided no
judicial review. 83 "Above all," one House Report decried, "there is no
remedy available to a citizen who has been wrongfully denied access to
the Government's public records."8
In 1966, FOIA was signed into law. 85 It abolished the vague APA
standards for releasing public information, and in their stead, created
the now-familiar nine enumerated categories of records that are exempt from disclosure.8 6 It also created a formal request-and-response
process with deadlines and rights to administrative appeal.87 FOIA also
included a judicial review provision,88 which was seen as one of its most
important provisions. As one member of Congress said at the time, "for
the first time in the Government's history, a citizen will no longer be at
the end of the road when his request for a Government document arbitrarily has been turned down by some bureaucrat."8 9
81S. REP. No. 88-1219, at 10 (1964).
82 Id. at 8, 10; see also S. REP. No. 89-813, at 5 (1965) (noting that one of the deficiencies in the present statute is that "there is no authority granted for any review of the use of
this vague phrase by Federal officials who wish to withhold information").
83 S. REP. No. 88-1219, at 10 (stating that "there [was] no remedy ... [for the] wrongful withholding of information ... by Government officials").
84 H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 5 (1966).
85 See Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552
(2006)).
- 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1)-(9). These exemptions cover records that are (1) properly
classified under an executive order, (2) related solely to internal personnel rules, (3) exempt from disclosure by another statute, (4) trade secret or confidential commercial information, (5) not discoverable in ordinary civil litigation against the agency, (6) would
cause an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (7) fall under certain categories of law
enforcement records, (8) pertain to certain banking matters, and (9) concern the location
of wells. Id.
87 Id. § 552(a) (3) (A) (providing for request and response); id. § 552(a) (6) (providing
deadlines for agency response and administrative appeal).
8Id. §552(a) (4) (B).
8 112 CONG. REc. 13,659 (1966) (statement of Rep. Gallagher) ("One of the most important provisions of the bill is subsection C, which grants authority to the Federal district
courts to order production of records improperly withheld. This means that for the first
time in the Government's history, a citizen will no longer be at the end of the road when
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Unlike the APA's standards of review, however, FOIA's judicial review provision requires de novo review of all agency decisions to withhold requested records.90 Given the APA standards of review, the choice
was hardly foreordained. Rather, it was seen as a break from the norm
that was integral to FOIA's success: "That the proceeding must be de
novo is essential in order that the ultimate decision as to the propriety of
the agency's action is made by the court and [to] prevent it from becoming meaningless judicial sanctioning of agency discretion." 91 Federal
courts have concluded that this provision "reflects Congress's intent to
provide greater judicial scrutiny over an agency's FOIA determinations
than over other agency rulings,"92 and "exerts a profound effect upon
the amount of respect the court must yield to agency determinations."9 3
Despite the clear mandate in the original 1966 Act, the de novo
review standard quickly lost its footing. In its 1973 decision in EPA v.
Mink, the Supreme Court considered a FOIA request for records that
had been classified under an executive order on the grounds of national
security.94 The Court concluded that despite FOIA's de novo review provision, Congress had not intended courts to review the propriety of classification decisions, and thus anything the government properly attested
was classified would be exempt from disclosure, without any substantive
judicial review.9 5 In essence, the Court in Mink deferred completely to
an agency determination on classification, which exempted the records
from disclosure.96
his request for a Government document arbitrarily has been turned down by some bureaucrat."); 112 CONG. REc. 13,649 (statement of Rep. Fascell) ("Let me make another
important point. S. 1160 opens the way to the Federal court system to any citizen who believes that an agency has unjustly held back information.").
90 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (B) ("In such a case the court shall determine the matter de
novo, and may examine the contents of such agency records in camera to determine
whether such records or any part thereof shall be withheld under any of the exemptions
set forth in subsection (b) of this section, and the burden is on the agency to sustain its
action.").
9 111 CONG. REc. 26,823 (1965); see also H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 9 (1966) ("The
proceedings are to be de novo so that the court can consider the propriety of the withholding instead of being restricted to judicial sanctioning of agency discretion.").
92 Rizzo v. Taylor, 438 F. Supp. 895, 899 (S.D.N.Y 1977).
93 Wash. Post Co. v. U.S. Dep't of State, 840 F.2d 26, 31 n.42 (D.C. Cir. 1988), vacated on
othergrounds, 898 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
94 EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 81-84 (1973), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 21, 1974,
Pub. L. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974), as recognized in CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985).
95 See Mink, 410 U.S. at 81 (noting that "Congress chose to follow the Executive's determination" on classification and thus did not permit in camera inspection of the documents or compelled disclosure of documents, such as those in this case, that were classified
pursuant to executive order).
96See id. at 93.
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Congress immediately responded to this decision. In 1974, now
particularly energized by the Watergate scandal and the public's deep
distrust of government power,9 7 Congress made several important
amendments to FOIA designed to strengthen the public's right to information."8 Relevant here, Congress amended the judicial review provision to override the Supreme Court's decision in Mink and to provide
for de novo review over all exemption claims, including national security classifications." The legislation reflected a rejection of the suggestion by some members of Congress that a deferential standard of review
should apply in the national security context.10 0 In fact, this issue was
partly the cause of President Gerald Ford's decision to veto the bill and
proclaim,
I propose, therefore, that where classified documents are requested the courts could review the classification, but would
have to uphold the classification if there is a reasonable basis
to support it. In determining the reasonableness of the classification, the courts would consider all attendant evidence
prior to resorting to an in camera examination of the document. 101
President Ford's veto thus called on Congress to implement a deferential standard of review over national security claims under FOIA.102
Congress's resolve to restore the de novo standard for judicial review of
9 Veto Battle 30 Years Ago Set Freedom of Information Norms, NAT'L SECURITY ARCHIVE,
www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB142/index.htm (last visited Dec. 24, 2012) (noting that movement toward reinvigorating FOIA was made against the background of the
Watergate scandal).
9 See Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974) (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006)).
9 Congress effectuated this change in two ways. First, it changed the language of Exemption 1 itself, which used to exempt records "specifically required by Executive order to
be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy," to make clear that
courts should look behind classification labels. See Mink, 410 U.S. at 81. The new Exemption 1 covers records "specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive
order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and . .. are in
fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). Second,
Congress added a provision to FOIA specifically allowing courts to conduct in camera review of withheld records. Id. § 552(a) (4) (B).
'0 See Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1193-94 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (remarking that Congress established de novo review against some senators' assertions that agency withholding
decisions involving national security matters should be reviewed using a "reasonable basis"
standard).
101120 CONG. REc. 36,243 (1974) (veto message from President Ford).
102 Id. at 36,243-44.
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FOIA cases, however, was so strong that Congress overrode the veto.103
Accordingly, the de novo standard was restored, even for cases in which
the government invokes the exemption that covers records classified
for national security reasons. 104 As one member of Congress stated in
response to President Ford's veto,
The courts, in my view, have a duty to look behind any claim
of exemption, which all too often in the past has been used to
cover up inefficiency or embarrassment even in foreign policy
matters which, many times, are fully known by other countries
but not printable in our own-supposedly the most democratic and most open in the world.10 5
Congress has thus twice insisted on de novo review over agency FOIA
exemption claims-once in 1966, when it first enacted the law, and
again in 1974, when it overruled Mink.
D. ExplainingFOIA's Exceptionalism
The legislative histories of the APA and FOIA demonstrate that
Congress acted deliberately both to build in great deference generally
to agency factual and discretionary determinations and to demand full
and searching judicial review over agencies' FOIA exemption determinations. Even apart from the words of the legislators who drafted and
passed these bills, the rationales supporting a deferential approach to
agency actions themselves justify a departure in FOIA cases. That is, the
reasons for invoking deference to other agency fact-finding and exercise of discretion do not apply with equal force to FOIA. Moreover, the
unique purposes of FOIA standing alone justify the scrutiny of de novo
judicial review.

103 See id. at 36,244; see also Ray, 587 F.2d at 1190-91 ("In 1974 Congress overrode a
presidential veto and amended the FOIA for the express purpose of changing this aspect
of the Mink case.").
104 See 120 CONG. REc. 36,244 (statement of Rep. Moorhead) ("As in the Watergate
debacle, the umbrella of 'national security' is now being raised in the veto message to
cover the real reasons for the bureaucrat's opposition to the public's right to know. ...
Contrary to the President's expressed view, the bill would not in any way bare our Nation's
secrets, nor would it jeopardize the security of sensitive national defense or foreign policy
information."); see also Ray, 587 F.2d at 1194 (explaining that Congress "stressed the need
for an objective, independent judicial determination, and insisted that judges could be
trusted to approach the national security determinations with common sense, and without
jeopardy to national security").
105 120 CONG. REc. 36,626 (statement of Rep. Reid).
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Deference to agency fact-finding and exercise of discretion is
rooted in the notion that agencies bring to bear a special expertise on
these matters. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit summarized Supreme Court
precedent on this point as follows: "We recognize that where, as here, a
court reviews an agency action 'involv[ing] primarily issues of fact,' and
where 'analysis of the relevant documents requires a high level of technical expertise,' we must 'defer to the informed discretion of the responsible federal agencies."' 106 The D.C. Circuit has seconded, indicating that it "routinely defers to administrative agencies on matters
relating to their areas of technical expertise" when looking at questions
of fact and discretionary decisions.10 7 In making FOIA decisions, however, although agencies are more familiar with the contents of their records than are the courts, the critical factual decisions that determine
whether the records must be released often turn on facts not within the
agency's expertise.
Consider the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). When the
NRC makes a decision about the necessary safety features of a nuclear
power plant, there is good reason for a court to defer to the expertise
of the scientific, technical, and policy staff at the NRC who know far
more about nuclear power plants than generalist judges know or could
hope to learn. Suppose, however, a member of the public submits a
FOIA request to the NRC to release the business records of one of its
regulated companies. If the NRC wishes to claim the FOIA exemption
pertaining to agency-held confidential commercial and financial records of third parties, 108 under which the question whether release of a
record would cause the third party submitter competitive harm is central to the inquiry,10 9 a court is likely as qualified as the NRC to assess
whether those records, if released, will cause competitive injury to the
company. Industry competition is not the technical specialty of the
NRC. To take another example, the Department of Homeland Security
does not have special expertise regarding which records, if released,
might cause a clearly unwarranted invasion of someone's personal pri-

106 Sierra Club v. EPA, 346 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Marsh v. Or. Natural
Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989)).
107 Tripoli Rocketry Ass'n v. ATF, 437 F.3d 75, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
108 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (4) (2006).
109 See Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 169 F.3d 16, 18 (D.C. Cir.
1999). The question of competitive harm is central to an inquiry whether records are exempt from disclosure under FOIA's Exemption 4, which covers confidential commercial
and financial information received from a business. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (4).
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vacy, which would render them exempt from disclosure under FOIA's
Exemption 6.110

Admittedly, some exemption determinations do turn on facts
uniquely within the agency's area of knowledge. Yet unique considerations at the heart of FOIA's transparency goal nonetheless justify Congress's departure from the APA. For instance, an agency is uniquely positioned to determine whether records are predecisional and
deliberative documents that are exempt from disclosure under Exemption 5's deliberative process privilege.11 ' The agency's expertise in its
own decision-making process, however, should not justify deference,
because the agency is not a neutral arbiter or guardian of the public
interest in a FOIA case. Instead, the agency might illegitimately overreach to keep information from the public and thereby protect itself
from embarrassment and avoid democratic accountability for its actions. Likewise, a law enforcement agency that makes a determination
that release of records will impede an ongoing investigation may have
particular competence in the area,112 but again, the agency would be
passing judgment on an exemption under which it could hide information about its own misconduct and prevent oversight. In such cases, the
agency is hardly a neutral decisionmaker.
In FOIA cases agencies frequently have illegitimate self-interest at
stake. Agencies have often been found to have failed to release records
to cover up their mistakes, embarrassing acts, or misconduct.1' 3 Even
more frequently, the institutional pressures of career advancement, risk
aversion, and institutional culture weigh heavily on the side of secrecy
for the agency employee considering a FOIA request.114 By contrast,
other types of agency actions tend to align the agency's interests with
the public. For example, when an agency adjudicates a benefits entitlement, it may have a "self-interest" in safeguarding its budget, but that
110 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (6).
In See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (5) (exempting "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums
or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation
with the agency").
112 This conclusion would justify withholding under Exemption 7(A). See 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b) (7) (A).
113 See Fuchs, supra note 12, at 153; see also Alan B. Morrison, BalancingAccess to Government-ControlledInformation, 14J.L. & POL'Y 115, 118 (2006) (hypothesizing why government officials routinely deny requests for documents).
114 Morrison, supra note 113, at 118 (noting that "no government official ever received
a promotion or a medal for releasing a document to the public," and that withholding
decisions are often "based on the agency official's different assessment of the benefits and
risks of disclosure as opposed to the assessment of those seeking the information and perhaps those who wrote the law").
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interest is shared by both Congress, which gave the agency its powers,
and the general public. Similarly, an agency conducting a rulemaking
may have something akin to "self-interest" in avoiding public backlash.
But again, these considerations are a legitimate part of the democratic
process of holding the agency accountable to the public. Indeed, agencies are typically required to seek public input as part of the APAmandated rulemaking process. 15 In contrast, the agency's self-interest
in the FOLA context does not advance a legitimate democratic purpose.
In fact, Congress's clear intent to provide de novo review and the reality
that traditional justifications for deference do not hold up in the FOIA
context require courts to look at FOIA determinations with a fresh eye.
A final issue of deference remains. Deference to agencies' legal
interpretations is almost entirely a creature of the judiciary; such deference is not mandated by the text of the APA." 6 In 1984, in Chewon v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, the Supreme Court justified courts'
deference to agencies' legal interpretations of ambiguous provisions in
statutes the agencies are charged with administering based on the theory that Congress has delegated to an agency the authority to interpret
the ambiguity." 7 This justification does not apply in the context of
FOIA. First, FOIA is not administered by any particular agency, but
rather binds all of them. 1 8 No single agency would have special competence to interpret FOIA's legal requirements or the language of any
particular exemption. Second, Congress expressly did not delegate to
an agency authority to interpret any ambiguities in FOIA. Instead, it
expressly required courts to review an agency's interpretations of FOIA
de novo." 9 Congress's choice to mandate de novo review of agencies'
115 See

5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).

116To be sure, a convincing argument can be made that the APA's provision dictating

that a reviewing court shall "decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional
and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an
agency action," is consistent with Chevron, and moreover that it intended to incorporate
previously decided cases such as Skidmore, which rested on the same principles. See Strauss,
supra note 44, at 1158-61.
117 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
us SeeAT&T, Inc., v. FCC, 582 F.3d 490, 496 (3d Cir. 2009), rev'd on other grounds, 131 S.
Ct. 1177 (2011); Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 792 F.2d 153, 162 n.4 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (en banc), aff'd, 484 U.S. 9 (1987).
1195 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (B) ("In such a case the court shall determine the matter de
novo . . . ."). One scholar suggests another rationale for rejecting deference to FOIA decisions: "FOIA denials, unlike most other agency actions, are made without adjudication,
notice and comment, or other protections." Fuchs, supra note 12, at 162. This rationale has
justified the lesser Skidmore deference, rather than Chevron deference, to agencies' legal
interpretations of statutes they are charged with administering. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 23135. It has not, however, been a reason to lessen deference substantially in the context of
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FOIA determinations, whether factual, legal, or discretionary, was thus
amply justified by the special considerations relevant to FOIA decisions.
II.

DE

Novo

REVIEW ON PAPER BUT NOT IN PRACTICE

Congress's assignment of de novo review to agency FOIA decisions,
in contrast to its treatment of nearly all other agency actions, was not
intended to be a distinction without a difference. 120 As the legislative
history reveals, legislators believed that the choice of which standard of
review should apply was important, presumably because different standards may lead to different outcomes. Countless judicial opinions, including the U.S. Supreme Court's own jurisprudence, presume that the
standard of review impacts the outcomes in particular cases.12 1 This, in
turn, would result in differing rates of reversal of agency actions.
Professor Paul Verkuil has examined the relationship between affirmance rate and the applicable standard of review. 122 His model for
understanding the operation of various levels of deference articulates
with specificity a sentiment shared by many jurists and scholars about
the way standards of review are meant to operate. 2 3 According to his
model, the most deferential standard, arbitrary and capricious, is akin
to a pass/fail standard that is "intended to produce a high pass rate."124
Verkuil likens the substantial evidence and clearly erroneous standards,
which supposedly entail still deferential but more searching review, to a
standard affirming all cases that get a "B" or "C" grade. 2 5 Finally, a rule
affirming only "A" grade work is akin to de novo review.126 Furthermore, Verkuil assigns hypothesized affirmance rates for each standard
of review: under a de novo review standard as falling between 40% and
50%, clearly erroneous between 70% and 80%, substantial evidence

agency fact-finding or discretionary decisions. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416 (applying
arbitrary and capricious review to facts found in an informal adjudication).
120 Verkuil, supra note 10, at 682.
121 Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999) ("The upshot in terms ofjudicial review is some practical difference in outcome depending upon which standard is used.");
Zaring, supra note 28, at 136-38.
122 Verkuil, supra note 10, at 692; see also RichardJ. Pierce,Jr., What Do the Studies ofJudicial
Review ofAgency Actions Mean?, 63 ADmIN. L. REv. 77, 84 (2011) (observing that Verkuil's study
is the most comprehensive empirical study of district court review of agency decisions).
123 See, e.g., Dickinson, 527 U.S. at 162.
124 Verkuil, supra note 10, at 688.
125 Id.
126 Id.
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between 75% and 85%, and arbitrary and capricious review at 85% to
90%.127

Verkuil's attempt to test this hypothesis empirically, however, produces a startling result-the Social Security Administration's disability
benefits determinations, reviewed for an abuse of discretion (akin to
arbitrary and capricious), are affirmed only 50% of the time, whereas
agencies' decisions not to release records under FOIA, reviewed de
novo, are affirmed at a rate of 90%.128 This result is nearly the exact
opposite of Verkuil's theorized affirmance rates for the relevant standards of review.' 29 He posits that some of the gap may be explained by
peculiar FOIA jurisprudence in the national security area, but concludes that this "phenomenon still does not explain the overall FOIA
outcomes divergence."130 Verkuil also notes judicial skepticism toward
FOIA claims as one factor in the high affirmance rate,11 but ultimately
concludes that "FOLA cases are hard if not impossible to explain in
terms of outcomes analysis if de novo is to be a meaningful standard of
review."132 Instead, Verkuil posits, other factors beyond the standard of
review must be producing the 90% affirmance rate. 33
As such, there is a wide gap between the law as it is theorized and
the law as it plays out in judicial review of agency FOIA decisions. 34
Id. at 689.
Id. at 719. At least one aspect of Verkuil's calculation of FOIA case outcomes seems
debatable, namely his inclusion as a form of "affirmance" those stipulated dismissals in
which no costs or attorneys' fees were awarded to the plaintiff. See id. at 713 n.152. Certainly, the assumption seems facially reasonable that a plaintiffs case must not have merit
if no costs or fees are awarded in a settlement, despite being available for prevailing plaintiffs. See id. One wonders whether that assumption would stand up to testing in light of
Evans v. Jeff D., in which the Supreme Court sanctioned settlement negotiations in which
favorable substantive results may be won by giving up rights to attorney's fees. 475 U.S.
717, 736-38 (1986). Nonetheless, the cases in this posture are not so numerous as to call
into any serious doubt the conclusion Verkuil draws from the study.
129 Verkuil, supra note 10, at 719.
13s Id. at 715.
131 See id. at 715-16. Verkuil attributes the judicial skepticism to concern about law enforcement effectiveness, the unsympathetic nature of many FOIA plaintiffs, concerns
about terrorism, and the burden of FOIA compliance on agencies. See id. As to the "unsympathetic nature" of many FOIA plaintiffs, he notes that FOIA plaintiffs are often prisoners appearing pro se or business competitors seeking to take advantage of the Act for
selfish reasons. Id. at 716.
132 Id. at 730.
133 See id.; see also Pierce, supra note 122, at 84-86 (supporting Verkuil's conclusion that
his findings require an examination of the decision-making context to identify unique
institutional characteristics that lead to the anomalous results he found).
134 Bridging this gap is often referred to as the work of new legal realism. See Stewart
Macaulay, Contracts, New Legal Realism, and Improving the Navigation of The Yellow Submarine,
80 TUL. L. REv. 1161, 1165, 1166 (2006) (describing the "new legal realism" as "mov[ing] us
127
128
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Verkuil's surprising affirmance rate finding cannot be fully explained
by existing theories of dispute resolution. First, one classic model examining the selection bias of those cases that make it to the end of the adjudicatory process anticipates that individual litigants acting in their
own self-interest will drop or settle all but the closest of cases, thereby
creating a strong bias for a 50% success rate for plaintiffs or for appellants in those adjudicated cases.135 Second, deviation from this predicted rate has been attributed to differing incentives between the parties and strategies used by frequent litigants-a theory that predicts
high success rates for repeat players, such as the government.13 6 Finally,
recent empirical work posits that regardless of the standard of review
announced in the case, courts affirm agencies between 60% and 70%
of the time.13 7
Although all of these theories may shed light on the FOIA affirmance rate observed by Verkuil, none fully explains it. Consider the
theory that cases that reach an adjudicatory resolution are the product
of a strong selection effect. Huge numbers of cases are never filed, are
voluntarily dismissed before an adjudication, or are settled between the
parties, and the outcomes of those cases that are adjudicated are
skewed by the decisions the litigants made along the way.138 New legal
realists have critiqued the practice of studying only those cases that
have reached a final judgment (or, even more so, a final appeal) as
"tak[ing] for granted that there is a great pyramid of disputing whose
most important level is at the top."139 Rather, these theorists emphasize
that how well the law is working must be analyzed on the ground; that
is, including lawsuits that are settled before an adjudication is reached
or are voluntarily dismissed or withdrawn as a result of pre-trial strate-

to the law in action and the living law," rather than an "assumed paradigm" of how the law
works). Professor David Zaring recently made the "normative recommendation ... that
courts and scholars ... focus more on the unarticulated bases for reversal in administrative
law and less on standards of review." Zaring, supra note 28, at 186.
13 See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-5 (1984).
136 See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves"Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95, 108 (1974); Priest & Klein, supra note 135, at 53.
137 See Zaring, supra note 28, at 169.
138 See generally Priest & Klein, supra note 135 (examining the issue of which cases make
it to adjudication).
139 Macaulay, supra note 134, at 1163; see Marc Galanter, Notes on the Future of Social Research in Law, in LAw & SOCIETY: READINGS ON THE SOCIAL STUDY OF LAw, 25, 25-27
(Stewart Macaulay et al. eds., 1995).

HeinOnline -- 54 B.C. L. Rev. 206 2013

2013]

Defering to Agency Secrecy and Withholding Decisions UnderFOIA

207

gies, and even disputes that never materialize into a lawsuit because of
the predictions of the litigants and the tactics of their lawyers. 140
Prominent theorists on pre-adjudication litigant behavior have
modeled the tendency to produce a 50% success rate for plaintiffs or
appellants where both parties have similar stakes and act to maximize
their self-interest in settlement negotiations.141 This bias toward a 50%
success rate is the result of litigants settling out all but the closest cases
based on expectations of success or failure and the risk involved.142 The
theorists acknowledge, however, that the "observed rate of success in
any individual set of cases is determined by several factors."143 In particular, unequal stakes in the litigation between the parties or other peculiar incentives unique to the class of litigation studied may produce
significant departures from this hypothesized success rate.144
See Macaulay, supra note 134, at 1163; see also Galanter, supra note 139, at 25-27
(contending that most legal scholars assume that the most important disputes are the ones
that go to trial).
141 Priest & Klein, supra note 135, at 5.
142 See id.
143 Id. at 55. Another factor that might affect the fifty percent success rate is unequal
information about the likely success between the parties. Id. at 19 ("[A]n important determinant of the extent to which the observed success rate approximates 50 percent will be
the parties' error in estimating the outcome."). At first blush, this seems like a plausible
explanation for deviation in the FOLA context, since the government almost always has
more information about the underlying lawsuit than the requester, and therefore might
make more accurate predictions about the merits. Typically, in FOIA litigation, the government releases records to the requester as it realizes that it has no defensible basis for
withholding them, and then the adjudication only concerns any remaining records still in
dispute. See, e.g., Hussain v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 674 F. Supp. 2d 260, 263 (D.D.C.
2009) (noting that the parties were only disputing the release of five out of the original
documents); Plaintiffs Unopposed Motion for an Extension of Time Within Which to
Respond to Defendant's Motion for SummaryJudgment at 1, Hussain, 674 F. Supp. 2d 260
(No. 07-1633) (noting that one day before the government filed its motion for summary
judgment, it released ninety-six pages of previously withheld documents to the plaintiff). If
the government's information led it to make more accurate predictions, it would not be
taking litigation positions it later realizes it cannot defend. Even as to those litigation positions it does ultimately defend, I suspect that the government makes that decision based
on the perceived importance of secrecy to the government's interests in light of the resources required to litigate the exemption, rather than the perceived likelihood of success
on the merits of the exemption's applicability. Although I cannot prove the government's
subjective motivations, my inclination is based on the agency's rational self-interest in
fighting to the end over records they do not want made public, for whatever reason (legitimate under FOIA or not), given that they are not bearing the expense of their defense,
which is provided by the U.S. Department ofJustice.
144 As one example, Professors George Priest and Benjamin Klein explain an eightyone percent success rate for the government in antitrust prosecutions as the product of
differential stakes between the parties. Priest & Klein, supra note 135, at 52-53 (citing
WILLIAM BAXTER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ANTITRUST: PRINCIPAL PAPER (Robert D.
Tollison ed., 1980)).
140
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The effect of the selection of cases that are adjudicated on outcomes is worthy of consideration in the FOIA context because only a
tiny fraction of agency FOIA decisions are ever reviewed in court. For
example, in fiscal year 2011, 644,165 FOIA requests were made, with
438,638 final agency decisions, resulting in 202,164 denials in full or in
part. 145 By contrast, there are consistently between 300 to 500 lawsuits
filed challenging FOIA denials each year. 46 Thus, the vast majority of
FOIA law operates wholly at the administrative level where pre-dispute
selection effects are likely to be strong.147 Nonetheless, the default 50%
success rate hypothesis does not operate here. Were that model to operate as predicted in FOIA cases, a high rate of affirmance of agency
denials would dissuade prospective litigants from pursuing marginal
cases. This, in turn, would increase the odds that comparatively more
meritorious cases would be adjudicated rather than settled, eventually
lowering the success rate of agencies back to an equilibrium of around
a 50% affirmance rate. As Verkuil demonstrates, however, the agencies'
90% success rate shows no signs of moderating.148
The primary factor Professors George Priest and Benjamin Klein
identify as potentially driving deviation from the 50% success rate hypothesis-differences in the incentives between the parties-may be
partially responsible for the affirmance rate in FOIA cases, but is
unlikely to explain it fully.149 In his influential work, Why the "Haves"
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change,Professor Marc
Galanter describes how repeat players in the litigation system engage in
a long-term strategy to procure favorable precedent, even at the cost of

145 FOIA Data at a Glance, What Is FOIA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., http://www.foia.gov (last
visitedJan. 11, 2013).
146 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATABASE (19792008), http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/landing.jsp (select "Find & Analyze Data,"
then search for "federal judicial center integrated database") (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
This dataset was examined in Margaret B. Kwoka, The Freedom of Information Act Trial, 61
Am. U. L. REv. 217, 227 (2011).
14 SeeJustin Cox, MaximizingInformation'sFreedom: The Nuts, Bolts, and Levers of FOIA, 13
N.Y. CrrY L. REv. 387, 396 (2010) ("[U]nlike many other areas of the law where enforcement
is broadly decentralized, only a small fraction of the millions of FOIA decisions made annually are ever scrutinized by someone with the power or authority to alter them.").
14s SeeVerkuil, supra note 10, at 734 (reporting the affirmance rate for the ten-year period of 1990 to 1999). Because Verkuil's statistical period begins almost twenty-five years
after FOIA's enactment, one might assume that if equilibrium were to be reached, this rate
would be abating.
149 See Priest & Klein, supra note 135, at 53; see also Verkuil, supra note 10, at 718 n.181
(citing Priest and Klein's selection hypothesis as a possible explanation for the FOIA affirmance rate).
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the immediate stakes in a single dispute.o5 0 When a "repeat player" litigates against a "one-shotter," the incentives of the parties are uneven.' 51
As Priest and Klein explain, "Stakes are most clearly symmetrical where
the parties seek solely a dollar judgment in a dispute over activities in
which neither party ever expects to engage again."15 2
For FOLA litigation, none of these ideal conditions for symmetrical
stakes exists. First, FOIA suits do not involve claims for monetary damages, but only injunctive relief. 53 Second, the government is the ultimate repeat player.154 Even breaking down the government defendants
by agency, FOIA requests are heavily concentrated on a relatively small
number of agencies and departments, each with its own interest in securing favorable long-term legal rules. 5 5 Finally, even the plaintiff may
be a repeat FOIA requester with his or her own long-term agenda,
thereby further distorting the incentives. 5 6 And even if the requester is
not a repeat requester, the importance of the information to each requester will vary widely.'57 Most especially, however, the government's
strategic advantages as a repeat player and long-term goal of procuring
favorable precedent over a short-term victory are likely to skew the preadjudication selection effect and contribute to the government's high
success rate.158
150 See Galanter, supra note 136, at 100-05.
151

See id.

152 Priest & Klein, supra note 135, at 28. Thus, they suggest that parties will have more

equal incentives to litigate (and therefore, would be more likely to proceed to trial) when
their stakes in the outcome are equal. They also note that if one of the parties (in the typical FOIA case, the government), expects to continue to engage in the same activity that
led to the dispute (here, denying a FOIA request), that party's stake in the litigation will be
much higher because the judgment will affect future behavior. Id.
6 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (B) (2006) (specifying that suits may be brought in district
courts to enjoin an agency from withholding records). Attorney's fees are, however, available to prevailing plaintiffs. Id.
154 See Galanter, supranote 136, at 111-12. As Galanter explains, having the government
as a party to a lawsuit increases the likelihood that a case is adjudicated because of the government's incentive to "externalize the decision to the courts," the incentive of opponents to
litigate against the government, and the government's unique decision-making process. Id.
155 For example, in fiscal year 2011, half of all FOIA requests were made to just four
agencies: the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and
Justice. Top 10 FederalAgencies Receiving the Most FOIA Requests, FOIA PROJECT, http://trac.syr.
edu/foiaproject/foiajrequests.shtml (last visitedJan. 11, 2013).
156 For example, organizations such as Public Citizen, the American Civil Liberties Union, and Judicial Watch are repeat players in the FOIA context.
157 See Galanter, supra note 136, at 111 (providing, as an example, an organization that
sponsors much church-state litigation, and explaining that there are some repeat players who
"seek not furtherance of tangible interests, but vindication of fundamental cultural commitments" and that when such a repeat player is involved, "there is less tendency to settle").
158 See id. at 100-05.
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It is unlikely, however, that all of the deviation from the 50% affirmance rate hypothesized both by Verkuil's work and Priest and Klein's
theory can be attributed to the government's repeat-player status and
the nature of the remedies. Were that the case, there should be similar
astronomical success rates for other types of litigation challenging
agency decisions, which share the government as the defendant and
also involve nonmonetary claims. Professor David Zaring recently conducted an empirical study on affirmance rates across various standards
of review.159 His findings, like Verkuil's, do not support the hypothesized affirmance rates set out by Verkuil.160 Instead, he concludes that
"[c]ourts reverse agencies at roughly the same [60 to 70%] rate, regardless of the standard of review." 161 He posits that despite handwringing over the appropriate standard of review, courts in practice approach review of agency actions as more of a reasonableness analysis,
thus producing similar affirmance rates across differing standards of
review. 162 This theory of judicial review is supported by his empirical
evidence.163
But FOIA is an outlier. The consistent 60% to 70% affirmance rate
across agencies, courts, and standards of review, is not reflected in
FOIA decisions, which, as noted, affirm agency nondisclosure at a 90%
rate.1 64 Zaring was surprised by Verkuil's finding in light of his own research; he suggests that possible differences may be attributed to different approaches that district and appellate courts may take in reviewing agency decisions. 165
Although this extraordinary affirmance rate may be attributable in
part to known theories, a 90% affirmance of agency FOIA decisions is
at odds with the statute's de novo standard of review and cannot be
fully explained by the dominant theories of pre-adjudication selection
effects or the unique nature of litigation against the government. Despite the courts' formal invocation of the statutory de novo standard,
this affirmance rate likely represents a super-deference, which produces
See generally Zaring, supra note 28 (summarizing the results of his findings).
See id. at 169.
161 Id.
162 Id. ("Although there are a number of possible conclusions to draw, the doctrinal one
worth taking most seriously is that, unless there is some reason to believe that these very similar validation rates mask very different sorts of inquiries, what courts are really doing is the
same sort of analysis regardless of the standard of review. The consistency in outcomes suggest a consistent inquiry: courts look to see if the agency has acted reasonably.").
163 Id.
159
160

164
165

Verkuil, supra note 10, at 719.
Zaring, supra note 28, at 176 n.134.
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even more affirmances than cases reviewed under formally deferential
standards. As the data indicate, the way courts actually review agency
decisions to withhold records under FOLA is not the de novo review
Congress required.
III. SYSTEMATIZING DEFERENCE TO SECRECY

An examination of FOIA decisions reveals that, whether intentionally or unintentionally, courts have developed a set of practices in FOIA
cases that collectively contribute to this super-deferential review. The
practices divide into two categories, which I call "spoken" and "unspoken" deference. The spoken deference practices are instances where
courts, despite the express mandate for de novo review, have concluded
that some deference to a relevant agency position is warranted under a
common law theory.166 Unspoken deference is a set of procedural practices developed uniquely for FOLA cases-contrary to the supposed
trans-substantivity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the "Federal
Rules")-which produce significant litigation advantages to the government and effectively result in deference to the government's position. 167 This two-pronged framework for understanding the ways that
courts defer to agency secrecy decisions helps to reveal the problematic
attributes of these practices and to identify potential responses.
A. Spoken Deference
Some amount of the deference observed in the 90% affirmance
rate in FOIA cases can be attributed to courts' expressly stated, judicially created deference doctrines.1 68 That is, in litigation involving certain FOIA exemptions, courts have proclaimed that they owe deference
to some agency representations relevant to a nondisclosure decision
despite the de novo review required by the statute.169 This type of def-

infra notes 168-223 and accompanying text.
infra notes 224-313 and accompanying text.
168 See Verkuil, supra note 10, at 714-15. Professor Paul Verkuil has conducted an empirical analysis of the effect of deference accorded the government in one subset of the
cases I group under "spoken deference," the national security claims made under Exemption 1, which exempts properly classified records. Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1) (2006). He
concludes that although these cases do increase the overall affirmance rate slightly, they
do not even approach a full explanation of the difference between a hypothesized de novo
affirmance rate and the observed rate. See Verkuil, supra note 10, at 736-37. Verkuil does
not, however, explore the full range of stated deference doctrines.
169 See generally Slegers, supra note 12 (providing examples of cases in which judges
have stated that they owe deference to agencies' determinations under FOIA).
166 See
167 See
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erence is found in FOIA cases involving three types of claimed agency
interests: (1) national security, (2) federal law enforcement, and (3) the
deliberative process privilege.1 70
1. National Security
National security has historically justified deference to decisions
made by the political branches of government. 171 Agency decisions are
no exception.17 2 Under FOIA, courts routinely review government
claims that records must be withheld from the public for national security reasons under an expressly deferential standard.173

170I do not include FOIA's Exemption 3, which covers records exempt from disclosure
by another statute. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (3). Because the other non-FOIA statute that
qualifies under Exemption 3 is often an organic statute that a particular agency is charged
with administering, some courts, including the D.C. Circuit, have concluded that the
agency's interpretation of that other statute is entitled to either Chevron or Skidmore deference. See, e.g., Landmark Legal Found. v. IRS, 267 F.3d 1132, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (applying Skidmore deference to the Internal Revenue Service's interpretation of a portion of the
Internal Revenue Code that specifically exempts taxpayer return information); Lehrfeld v.
Richardson, 132 F.3d 1463, 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (applying Chevron deference to a Department of the Treasury interpretation, in a regulation, of the same statute); Tax Analysts
v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (same). Other courts, however, have taken the
approach that an Exemption 3 statute, like other FOIA exemptions, should be narrowly
construed, and thus, that the traditional administrative law deference doctrines do not
apply to agencies' interpretations of those statutes. See A. Michael's Piano, Inc. v. FTC, 18
F.3d 138, 144 (2d Cir. 1994) (detailing the disagreement among the circuits). I am setting
aside the question of which position is the correct one and the effect of this potentially
unwarranted deference on the overall affirmance rate, because there are not many FOIA
cases according deference under Chevron or Skidmore to agency interpretations of Exemption 3 statutes.
171 For instance, in Korematsu v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court infamously upheld the governmental order that Japanese Americans be held in internment camps as
justified by wartime exigencies. See 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944). Although an extreme example, invocations of national security justifications commonly get special solicitude from the
courts. More recently, in Zadvydas v. Davis, the Court confronted an immigration detention situation in which it declared that although "terrorism or other special circumstances"
were not present in that case, if they were, "arguments might be made for ... heightened
deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of national
security." 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001).
172Kathryn E. Kovacs, Leveling theDeference PlayingField,90 OR. L. REv. 583, 585 (2011)
(arguing that the military continues to enjoy "super-deference," even though the general
APA standards apply).
173Fuchs, supra note 12, at 163 ("Even when purporting to conduct a de novo review as
mandated by FOIA, courts have adopted a doctrine of deference to executive claims that
secrecy is needed to protect national security interests."). In her article, one commentator
chronicles the lack of meaningful review of national security claims under FOlA. See id. at
163-68.
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FOIA protects national security interests primarily under Exemption 1, which exempts records "specifically authorized under criteria
established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
national defense or foreign policy and ... are in fact properly classified
pursuant to such Executive order."174 This language was adopted in
1974 to overrule the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in EPA v. Mink, in
which the Court held that classification decisions by the government
were not reviewable under FOLA, except to determine if the record was
in fact classified. 75 The new language, paired with a new provision expressly permitting a court to review withheld records in camera, 7 6 was
intended to provide the same type of review for classification decisions
as for other FOLA withholdings by requiring courts to verify that the
records were in fact properly classified under an executive order.
Although the idea that national security concerns uniquely justify a
heightened level of secrecy is facially appealing, national security experts have explained that there are many instances in which publicity
and transparency would increase security, rather than hamper it.177
When information is kept secret, it is often not shared even in other
parts of government that might be able to augment the knowledge on
the subject matter and advance security interests. 7 8 Moreover, an unaware public cannot be vigilant or aid in the government's security efforts. 79 Experts have concluded that overclassification itself reduces the
effectiveness of classification.Iso Although legitimate reasons for secrecy
exist and some amount of information should be protected, Congress

5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1) (2006).
EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 81 (1973), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub.
L. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974), as recognized in CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985); see supra
notes 94-105 and accompanying text. The language of the original 1966 Act, which was
considered by the Court in Mink, exempted records "specifically required by Executive
order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy." See Mink,
410 U.S. at 81.
1765 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (B).
177 Fuchs, supra note 12, at 136-39 (citing Emerging Threats: Overclassificationand PseudoClassification:HearingBefore the Subcomn. on Nat' Sec., Emerging Threats, and Int'l Relations of
the H. Comm. on Gov't Reform, 109th Cong. 3 (2005) (statement of J. William Leonard, Director, ISOO, National Archives & Records Administration)).
178 Id. at 136.
179 Id. at 138 (citingjoint Investigation into September 11th: HearingBefore thef S. and H. Intelligence Comms., 107th Cong. 1 (2002)) (discussing the congressional testimony that suggested
that only publicity could have thwarted the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001).
1s Id. at 139 (citing INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 7
(2002)).
17

175
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rationally can require the executive branch to justify national security
withholdings as it does other secrecy decisions. 181
Despite two attempts by Congress to establish de novo judicial review of decisions to withhold records based on national security, courts
acknowledge outright the deference they afford to claims of national
security classification.18 2 As one court explained:
Courts ... accord substantial deference to the [agency's] de-

termination that information must be withheld under Exemption 1, and will uphold the agency's decision so long as the
withheld information 'logically falls into the category of the
exemption indicated' and there is no evidence of bad faith on
the part of the agency. 8 3
Another court elaborated, "Even in those instances where the court
might have its own view of the soundness of the original policy decision
... it must defer to the agency's evaluation of the need to maintain the
TM
secrecy of the methods used to carry out such [classified] projects."'
Courts are also reluctant to exercise their statutory power to review
classified records in camera, citing concerns about resource constraints
and intrusions on the agency. 8 5
Courts rationalize the deference given to agency positions under
Exemption 1 by employing the legislative history of the 1974 amendments, which reveals statements from the amendments' proponents
that agencies' affidavits would carry substantial weight.18 6 As the U.S.
181 See

id.
e.g., ACLU v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 681 F.3d 61, 76 (2d Cir. 2012) ("[T]his Court
must adopt a 'deferential posture in FOIA cases regarding the uniquely executive purview
of national security.'" (citation omitted)); Maynard v. CIA, 986 F.2d 547, 555-56 (1st Cir.
1993) (stating that courts afford substantial deference to the CIA's determination that
information must be withheld under Exemption 1); King v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 830 F.2d
210, 217-18 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that the court owes substantial weight to detailed
agency explanations, as set forth in affidavits, in the national security context).
183 Maynard, 986 F.2d at 555-56 (citations omitted).
184 Stein v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 662 F.2d 1245, 1254 (7th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted).
185 Slegers, supra note 12, at 232.
186 See 120 CONG REC. 34,167 (1974) (statement of Rep. Moorhead) ("First of all, a
court could only determine whether the information was 'properly classified pursuant to
(an) Executive order.' In other words, the judge would have to decide whether the document met the criteria of the President's order for classification-not whether he himself
would have classified the document in accordance with his own ideas of what should be
kept secret. Second, as we have said in the joint explanatory statement of the committee of
conference: 'The conferees expect that Federal courts, in making de novo determinations
in section 552(b) (1) cases under the Freedom of Information law, will accord substantial
weight to an agency's affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of the disputed
182 See,

HeinOnline -- 54 B.C. L. Rev. 214 2013

2013]

Deferringto Agency Secrecy and WithholdingDecisions Under FOIA

Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit explained, Congress "emphasized
that in reaching a de novo determination the judge would accord substantial weight to detailed agency affidavits and take into account that
the executive had 'unique insights into what adverse affects might oc187
cur as a result of public disclosure of a particular classified record."'
Without doubt, this legislative history suggests that some members of
Congress were concerned that agency expertise not be ignored.
Despite what some courts contend, 18a according substantial weight
to an affidavit is not inconsistent with de novo judicial review. Rather, in
evaluating an exemption claim, a court could easily take agency affidavits into account, while still conducting an independent review of all of
the arguments and evidence before it. But the statute itself does not

state the weight to be accorded the agency's affidavit, which would suggest that the affidavit should be treated like any other piece of summary judgment evidence. And yet, citing legislative history, the D.C.
Circuit has declared that "Congress has instructed the courts to accord
'substantial weight' to agency affidavits in national security cases."189
Not so. The statute prescribes de novo review.190 As the former Vice
President and General Counsel of the National Security Archive, a
watchdog group, noted, "In a subtle but telling shift of nomenclature,
the D.C. Circuit ... [has] called the standard of review in [national security] cases 'the substantial weight standard' rather than the de novo
standard of review mandated by Congress." 191 In sum, courts' reluctance to conduct searching review of claims of exemption based on
classification cannot be justified on the grounds of legislative history,

record."'); see also Slegers, supra note 12, at 227 (acknowledging the legislative history, but
maintaining that "it is also clear that the role that Congress intended for courts involves
more than merely approving classifications that appear logical," as courts have done).
187 Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (quoting S. REP. No. 93-1200, at
12 (1974)).
188 See Stein, 662 F.2d at 1253 ("From these statements, it appears that Congress did not
intend that the courts would make a true de novo review of classified documents, that is, a
fresh determination of the legitimacy of the classification status of each classified document.").
189 Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing S. REP. No. 93-1200, at 12
(1974)).
190 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (B) (2006).
191Fuchs, supra note 12, at 165 (citing Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 1-44, 147-48 (D.C. Cir.
1980)); see also Christina E. Wells, "NationalSecurity" Information and the Freedom of Information Act, 56 ADrmUN. L. REv. 1195, 1208 (2004) ("Most observers agree that courts are generally deferential to claims of harm to national security, rarely overriding the government's
classification decisions. Although purporting to apply de novo review, they effectively apply
something less." (footnote omitted)).
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for the 1974 amendments clearly established a mandate for courts to
conduct such review de novo.192
In addition to Exemption 1, Exemption 3 is often at issue in national security cases. There, too, the courts have deferred to agencies'
nondisclosure decisions. Exemption 3 covers records "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute,"193 and the government often relies
on the statute that protects from disclosure Central Intelligence Agency
records reflecting "intelligence sources and methods."19 4 The Supreme
Court has weighed in on the deference debate on sources and methods, explaining in a leading Exemption 3 case, CIA v. Sims, decided in
1985, that "[t] he decisions of the Director, who must of course be familiar with 'the whole picture,' as judges are not, are worthy of great deference given the magnitude of the national security interests and potential risks at stake."19 5 In sum, courts have now fully integrated
deference into claims regarding national security made under FOIA,
without any statutory justification.
2. Law Enforcement
Historically, routine law enforcement activities have not enjoyed
the same privileged legal status as do military and national security matters. Nonetheless, judicial decisions have given rise to deference in at
192 Ray, 587 F.2d at 1193 ("The legislative history underscores that the intent of Congress regarding de novo review stood in contrast to, and was a rejection of, the alternative
suggestion proposed by the Administration and supported by some Senators: that in the
national security context the court should be limited to determining whether there was a
reasonable basis for the decision by the appropriate official to withhold the document.").
193 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (3). Interestingly, there is an alternative claim that the interpretation of Exemption 3 statutes, which tend to be statutes on particular subjects and directed
at particular agencies, are entitled to Chevron deference. See Slegers, supra note 12, at 229
(suggesting that a different standard of deference seems appropriate for Exemption 3);
supra note 170. The decisions discussed in this Article, however, do not apply the Chevron
framework.
194 National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i) (1) (2006) ("The Director of National Intelligence shall protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.").
195 Sims, 471 U.S. at 179. Notably, the deference described in these decisions is not justified by Chevron or Skidmore principles but rather is created out of whole cloth based on
the judiciary's notions of national security interests. See id.; Brent Filbert, Note, Freedom of
Information Act: CIA v. Sims-The CIA Is Given Broad Powers to Withhold the Identities of Intelligence Sources, 54 UMKC L. REv. 332, 342 (1986) (arguing that Sims gave the CIA broad discretion to protect the identities of individuals involved with the CIA's intelligence operations under FOIA and the National Security Act of 1947); see also Christina E. Wells, CIA v.
Sims: Mosaic Theory and Government Attitude, 58 ADMIN. L. REv. 845, 846 n.6 (2006) (collecting articles by scholars who have criticized Sims for its broad reading of the National Security Act).
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least two different situations when agencies claim records are exempt
under FOIA due to a law enforcement concerns.
Law enforcement interests are protected under FOIA Exemption
7.196 To demonstrate that this exemption applies, the agency must first
cross Exemption 7's threshold requirement that the records were "compiled for law enforcement purposes." 197 Both agencies whose principal
function is law enforcement, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and agencies that engage in law enforcement activities and other
administrative functions, such as the Internal Revenue Service, can
claim this exemption.1 98
The threshold requirement, however, has been interpreted not to
be the same for all agencies. In considering an agency's claim that it
has passed the Exemption 7 threshold, the D.C. Circuit presumes that
an agency acts within its legislated purpose. 199 Agencies whose primary
function is law enforcement may provide "less exacting proof' that the
records concern law enforcement.2 00 By contrast, a court must "scrutinize with some skepticism" claims made by mixed-function agencies
that records were compiled for law enforcement purposes. 201 The end
result, the D.C. Circuit has explained, is that "courts apply a more deferential standard to a claim that information was compiled for law en-

196 Exemption

7 exempts from mandatory disclosure

records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A)
could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B)
would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C)
could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private
institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case
of a record or information compiled by criminal law enforcement authority in
the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement
investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement
investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected
to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.

§ 552(b)
Id.

5 U.S.C.
197
98

(7) (2006).

Tax Analysts v. IRS, 294 F.3d 71, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

19 Pratt v.
200 Id.
201 Id.
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forcement purposes when the claim is made by an agency whose primary function involves law enforcement." 202
Other circuits have followed the D.C. Circuit's lead and adopted its
standard.20 3 Diverging from the D.C. Circuit, however, is another group
of circuits that has adopted an even more deferential standard, called
the "per se" rule. 204 Under this rule, "documents compiled by law enforcement agencies are inherently records compiled for law enforcement purposes within the meaning of Exemption 7."205 Accordingly,
under the per se rule, an agency that is primarily a law enforcement
agency need not offer any proof at all that records are compiled for law
enforcement purposes, not even the "less exacting proof' the D.C. Circuit requires. 206 Although longstanding, these deference doctrines are
nowhere rooted in the statutory text.
Deference under Exemption 7 does not end there. After meeting
the threshold requirement of demonstrating that records were compiled for law enforcement purposes, an agency must also demonstrate
that law enforcement records fall within one of six enumerated categories. 207 The first category covers records the release of which "could
reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings." 208
In 2003, in Centerfor National Security Studies v. U.S. Department ofJustice,
the D.C. Circuit declared that some agency assertions made pertaining
to this second step of the Exemption 7 analysis are also entitled to deferential treatment by the courts. 209 The court considered a claim that
the release of records concerning individuals detained as part of a postSeptember 11 investigation would interfere with that investigation.2 10
202Tax Analysts, 294 F.3d at 77.
203See, e.g., Abdelfattah v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 488 F.3d 178, 184-86 (3d Cir.
2007); Church of Scientology v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 611 F.2d 738, 748 (9th Cir. 1979).
204See, e.g., Jordan v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 668 F.3d 1188, 1195 (10th Cir. 2011); Jones
v. FBI, 41 F.3d 238, 245-46 (6th Cir. 1994); Williams v. FBI, 730 F.2d 882, 883-86 (2d Cir.
1984); Kuehnert v. FBI, 620 F.2d 662, 666-67 (8th Cir. 1980); Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468,
473-76 (1st Cir. 1979).
203Jordan, 668 F.3d at 1193 (quoting Trentadue v. Integrity Comm., 501 F.3d 1215,
1235 (10th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
206 See id.

207See5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (2006); supranote 196 (providing the text of Exemption 7).
208Id. § 552(b) (7) (A).
209 See Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 928 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
210 Id. The plaintiffs primarily sought the detainees' names, attorneys, dates of arrest
and release, locations of arrest and detention, and reasons for detention. Id. at 921. The
government claimed that release of this information would "enable al Qaeda or other
terrorist groups to map the course of the investigation and thus develop the means to impede it." Id. at 928.
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The court concluded that an agency's assertion that releasing records
would harm national security is entitled to the "same deference under
Exemption 7(A)" as it would receive if the agency were invoking Exemptions 1 or 3, the national security exemptions.21 ' 'Judicial deference depends on the substance of the danger posed by disclosure-that
is, harm to the national security-not the FOIA exemption invoked,"
the D.C. Circuit declared.2 12 Although that case was limited to enforcement proceedings involving national security interests, this represents the first time that such deference has been granted in the context
of a routine law enforcement exemption claim.213 Whether courts will
apply this deference to enforcement proceedings other than national
security related matters remains to be seen.
3. Deliberative Process
Perhaps the most surprising appearance of spoken deference to
agency FOIA decisions has occurred when agencies invoke the deliberative process privilege under FOIA's Exemption 5. The deliberative
process privilege is meant to protect the agency's decision-making
process. 214 To that end, it exempts from mandatory disclosure records
that are both predecisional and deliberative.215 Records are considered
predecisional if they were created before a final decision was reached
on the records' subject matter, and are deliberative if they contain
opinion, recommendation, or policymaking material, rather than factual accounts. 2 16
Deferring to an agency's determination that the release of records
would injure its own decision-making process opens the door for an
agency to claim an exemption for a wide swath of records. Nonetheless,
at least one district court judge has concluded that some deference is
warranted.2 17 Proclaiming that "[tihe [agency] is better situated than
either [the requester] or this Court to know what confidentiality is
211Id. at 928; see supra notes 171-195 and accompanying text.

212Ctr for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 928.
213As one scholar has explained, this decision conflicts with courts' original position
that deference to national security concerns is "intended for (b) (1) [classification] exemptions only." Wells, supra note 191, at 1208.
214 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (5) (2006) (exempting "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency"); see United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792, 798-99 (1984).
215See Coastal States Gas Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
216See id.
217Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Consumer Prods. Safety Comm'n, 600 F. Supp. 114, 118
(D.D.C. 1984).
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needed 'to prevent injury to the quality of agency decisions' while the
decision-making process is in progress," the court concluded that
"[t]here should be considerable deference to the [agency's] judgment
as to what constitutes . . . 'part of the agency give-and-take-of the de-

liberative process-by which the decision itself is made."'2 18 Although
no precedential opinion has endorsed this type of deference, several
other district court judges have adopted the same approach. 21 9
The potential for agency abuse in claiming the deliberative process
privilege is particularly troubling because illegitimate agency selfinterest, such as protection from embarrassment, is more likely to be a
factor in a deliberative process case. Moreover, there is a serious risk of
"secret law," that is, agency policies and decisions that affect the public
but about which the public has no information. 220 Preventing secret law
is at the heart of the purpose of FOIA.2 21 Again, the deference these
courts give to agency representations has no statutory basis, and flies in
the face of the clear statutory command to review de novo all agency
decisions to withhold records under FOIA.
Taken together, the courts' express deference to agency exemption claims is substantial. Deference doctrines have crept into parts of
four of FOIA's nine statutory exemptions. 222 None is based on statutory
text or reflects congressional intent. Rather, the deference doctrines
reflect courts' views on the propriety of second-guessing the executive
branch in particular circumstances, divorced from the mandate of the
governing law.223

218 Id. (citations omitted).
219 See NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., No.

07Civ.3378(GEL), 2007 WL 4233008, at *10 (S.D.N.Y Nov. 30, 2007); Williams .
McCausland, No. 9OCiv.7563(RWS), 1994 WL 18510, at *9 (S.D.N.YJan. 18, 1994); Rollins
v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, No. Civ.A. H-90-3170, 1992 WL 12014526, at *8 (S.D. Tex. June 30,
1992); Pfeiffer v. CIA, 721 F. Supp. 337, 340 (D.D.C. 1989).
220 See Tax Analysts, 117 F.3d at 617 ("A strong theme of our [deliberative process] opinions is that an agency will not be permitted to develop a body of 'secret law.'"); Assembly of
Cal. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 968 F.2d 916, 920 (1992) ("Because an agency's interpretations of its decisions often become the 'working law' of the agency, documents deemed
'postdecisional' do not enjoy the protection of the deliberative process privilege. This insures
that the agency does not operate on the basis of 'secret law.'" (citations omitted)).
221 See Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, 598 F.3d 865, 872 (D.C. Cir.
2010) ("As we have repeatedly explained, FOIA provides no protection for such 'secret
law' developed and implemented by an agency.").
222 See supra notes 168-223 and accompanying text.
223 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (B) (2006); supra notes 120-165 and accompanying text.
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B. Unspoken Deference
In addition to instances where courts develop deferential standards
of review for particular questions under FOIA, in almost every FOIA
case, special procedures have effectively resulted in deference to the
government's claimed need for secrecy. 224 In these instances, courts
have developed procedures unique to FOIA litigation that weigh in favor of the government's nondisclosure position. These neutral-sounding
procedural rules sometimes appear sensible and benign. Both individually and especially cumulatively, however, these devices have an even
greater effect in rubber-stamping government secrecy decisions than
the spoken deference categories discussed above because they apply in
every litigated FOIA case.
To understand how these practices came about, it is necessary to
consider how FOIA cases are typically litigated. Unlike in most other
civil litigation, FOIA expressly provides that the defendant (i.e., the
government) bears the burden to prove that an exemption to disclosure applies.2 25 Also, unlike other civil litigation, there is an inherent
information imbalance between the parties because the government
knows the contents of the records that have been requested, whereas
the FOIA plaintiff almost always does not.226 Moreover, the government's knowledge about the records' creation and use, and the likely
effect of the release of the record on private, public, or national interests, is often far greater than the knowledge held by FOIA plaintiffs, if
not exclusive.2 27 Thus, although the government bears the burden of
proof, it also holds almost all of the information relevant to meeting
that burden.
Because of these peculiarities, courts have sometimes concluded
that the typical adversarial process cannot apply in the same way as in
other civil litigation, and thus special procedures are needed in FOIA
cases. 2 28 These special processes sometimes have arisen from an attempt to help requesters themselves navigate the difficult litigation
See infra notes 225-313 and accompanying text.
U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (B) ("[T]he burden is on the agency to sustain its action.").
226 Information imbalances in other civil litigation are, of course, designed to be equalized through the discovery process. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (making discoverable any nonprivileged information relevant to any party's claim or defense); see also infra notes 243271 and accompanying text (discussing discovery issues unique to FOIA cases).
227 Although discovery could potentially remedy this imbalance, judicial decisions have
rendered it ineffective in the FOIA context. See infra notes 243-271 and accompanying text.
228 See, e.g., Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("This lack of knowledge by the party seeking disclosure seriously distorts the traditional adversary nature of
our legal system's form of dispute resolution.").
224

225 5
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landscape, but they often thwart any real possibility of challenging the
government's factual assertions and undermine the statutory requirement that the government justify its withholding decisions. Although
these FOIA-specific procedural practices are interrelated, I categorize
them into four groups. 2 29
1. Vaughn Index
The Vaughn index is the most famous FOIA-specific procedural
device. It arose early in FOIA's history, when, in 1973, the D.C. Circuit
decided Vaughn v. Rosen.230 As the court explained, the Vaughn index
procedure was designed to remedy the information imbalance inherent
in FOIA lawsuits: "In light of this overwhelming emphasis upon disclosure, it is anomalous but obviously inevitable that the party with the
greatest interest in obtaining disclosure is at a loss to argue with desirable legal precision for the revelation of the concealed information."231
In this regard, the court then noted that, in contemporary FOIA litigation, the government typically was permitted to "aver that the factual
nature of the information is such that it falls under one of the exemptions....

[and then] the opposing party [was] comparatively helpless

to controvert this characterization. "232
The D.C. Circuit first considered requiring routine in camera review of records, but concluded that such review would overburden
courts and would fail to remedy the plaintiffs inability to test the government's exemption claim.233 The court then turned to Supreme
Court precedent that generally described detailed affidavits or oral testimony as the basis for establishing the government's entitlement to
withhold records under FOIA. 234 From there, the D.C. Circuit created
the Vaughn index procedure as a remedy to the information imbalance.
The court required the government to separate the withheld materials,
index the withholdings, and provide a separate justification for each
withheld record or separate section thereof. 235 It also required that the
justification be a "relatively detailed analysis in manageable seg-

See infra notes 230-313 and accompanying text.
Vaughn, 484 F.2d at 823.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 825-26.
233 Id. at 825.
234 See id. at 826 (citing Mink, 410 U.S. at 93).
235 Id. at 827.
229
230
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ments."23 6 These requirements in many ways parallel the privilege logs
required in civil discovery.23 7
The D.C. Circuit undoubtedly created the Vaughn index to better
achieve FOIA's maximum disclosure goals and to promote genuine
testing of government FOIA exemption claims.238 In theory, the Vaughn
index process should help combat the information imbalance problem
in FOIA litigation.239 The Vaughn index implementation, however, has
revealed deep deficiencies. Now, it is often more of a hindrance than a
help to requesters. These deficiencies are primarily threefold. First,
Vaughn indices have become so boilerplate that they are often not of
great use to test the government's claims. 240 Second, as a result of these
boilerplate indices, FOIA litigation often focuses on a dispute about the
adequacy of the Vaughn index, rather than a dispute about the merits of
the exemption claims themselves-that is, parties contest whether the
Vaughn index provides sufficient detail about documents instead of
contesting whether a document falls within a claimed exemption.2 41
Finally, and perhaps most seriously, the creation of the Vaughn procedure has been used to justify denying FOLA plaintiffs any additional
discovery as normally permitted in civil cases242 discussed further below.
Given the limited assistance the Vaughn index provides to most FOIA
236 Vaughan, 484

F.2d at 826.
R. Civ. P. 26(b) (5) (describing how to claim a privilege in civil discovery).
238 See Vaughan, 484 F.2d at 823-24.
239 Notably, even assuming the Vaughn index were a useful tool, courts have whittled
away at requiring its use, finding more and more categories of cases for which a Vaughn
index is unnecessary. See, e.g., Fiduccia v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 185 F.3d 1035, 1042 (9th Cir.
1999) (holding that a Vaughn index is not required when it is not needed to restore the
traditional adversarial process); Crancer v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 999 F.2d 1302, 1316 (8th
Cir. 1993) (en banc) (holding that a Vaughn index is not required when documents are
categorically exempt); Lesar v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(holding that a Vaughn index was unnecessary for information obtained from a confidential source during a law enforcement investigation because application of the exemption
did not depend on the contents of the records).
24 See Robert P. Deyling, JudicialDeference and De Novo Review in Litigation over National
Security Infarination Under the Freedom of Information Act, 37 VILL. L. REv. 67, 100 (1992) (providing examples of how the government minimizes disclosure while appearing to describe
documents, and thereby fails to allow plaintiffs to formulate meaningful contrary arguments or to assist the court in resolving FOIA disputes); see also Fuchs, supra note 12, at 172
("When courts expect detail, agencies can deliver. When courts are unwilling to insist on a
serious specification and indexing of exemption claims, by contrast, agencies take the easy
route of relying on boilerplate justifications.").
241 See Deyling, supra note 240, at 73. The fault for this phenomenon certainly lies, at
least in part, in plaintiffs' strategic choice to challenge the Vaughn index rather than to
simply challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the government's exemption
claim on summary judgment.
242 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37, 45.
237 See FED.
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plaintiffs, the procedure's biggest failure may be that it has curtailed
meaningful discovery.
2. Discovery
The courts' general failure to allow discovery in FOIA cases is itself
a form of deference to the government. As the D.C. Circuit has acknowledged, the Federal Rules, which govern the discovery process,
apply with equal force to, and provide no exemption for, FOIA cases. 243
The Federal Rules govern the procedure in federal district courts in all
civil suits with limited exceptions that do not encompass FOIA cases. 244
As a result, the standard discovery tools-including interrogatories,
requests for admission, requests for production, and depositions-are
all formally available. 245
District courts certainly have great discretion to control discovery
in all civil litigation. 246 As one prominent proceduralist has noted, there
is "a virtual riot of discretion" exercised by district courts in applying
the Federal Rules. 24 7 Indeed, district courts retain this "broad discretion
to manage the scope of discovery" in FOIA cases as well.248
This discretion, however, has not been exercised on a case-by-case
basis, as the Federal Rules envision. Courts instead have systematically
eliminated discovery procedures in FOIA cases. In a repeated mantra,
district courts have proclaimed that "[d]iscovery is generally unavail243 See Weisberg v. Webster, 749 F.2d 864, 867-68 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The only possible
exception to full discovery for FOIA cases is that FOIA cases could be construed as actions
for "review on an administrative record," thereby relieving the parties of initial disclosure
requirements. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (1) (B); Pohl v. EPA, No. 09-1480, 2010 WL 786918,
at *3 n.2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2010) (noting the government's position that initial disclosures
are not required in FOIA cases). Although this construction seems a stretch because FOIA
cases produce no true administrative record and the record is not closed at the administrative level, even this exemption from initial disclosures would have no effect on active discovery requests and the parties' obligations to respond. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (1) (B)
(exempting only initial disclosure requirements). In addition, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia has adopted a local rule that exempts FOIA cases from initial
disclosures, though the basis for that rule is unclear, and no other district court has followed its lead. See D.D.C. LCvR 16.3, 26.2.
244 See Weisberg, 749 F.2d at 867; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 1, 81 (defining the scope and
applicability of the Federal Rules).
245 See Weisberg, 749 F.2d at 868; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37 (providing the discovery
devices available under the Federal Rules).
246 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 699-700 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
247 Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of TranssubstantiveProcedure:An Essay on Adjusting
the "One Size Fits All"Assumption, 87 DENv. U. L. REv. 377, 384 (2010).
248 SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see Whitfield v.
U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 255 Fed. App'x 533, 534 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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able in FOIA actions,"249 or that "[t]ypically, discovery is not part of a
FOIA case."250 Another court has observed that "[d]iscovery is usually
not permitted in a FOIA case if the government's affidavits were made
in good faith and provide specific detail about the methods used to
produce the information. "251
In 1978, Judge David Bazelon of the D.C. Circuit made the first serious attempt to address the question of discovery in FOIA cases, in a
dissent in Goland v. CIA. 25 2 He began with the unremarkable proposition
that "[w]ithout discovery, a party to litigation may not have access to
facts necessary to oppose a motion for summary judgment."25 3 Judge
Bazelon argued that although there was no contrary evidence demonstrating that the CIA's response to a FOIA request was inadequate or in
bad faith, no such evidence could be produced without according the
plaintiff the opportunity to take discovery.254 In considering the effect of
the Vaughn index procedure on the availability of discovery, Judge
Bazelon noted that the plaintiff in Vaughn had not attempted to use discovery, and thus the sole issue before the court in Vaughn was whether
the agency affidavits were sufficient to demonstrate that the claimed exemptions applied.255 Accordingly, the Vaughn index was designed to test
the government's statutory burden, not to replace the default system of
discovery under the Federal Rules.256
Judge Bazelon's reasoning, however, did not carry the day. The
presumption that a Vaughn index is sufficient to meet discovery needs
has rendered other discovery nearly unavailable. In 1996, the Ninth
Circuit, in Minier v. CIA, offered a typical statement of the impact of
Vaughn indices on discovery when it declared that "Vaughn indices are
249 Wheeler v. CIA, 271 F. Supp. 2d 132, 139 (D.D.C. 2003); see also People for the Am.
Way Found. v. Nat'1 Park Serv., 503 F. Supp. 2d 284, 308 (D.D.C. 2007) ("FOIA actions
typically do not involve discovery." (citation omitted)).
250 Schiller v. INS, 205 F. Supp. 2d 648, 653 (W.D. Tex. 2002); see also Rugiero v. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, 257 F.3d 534, 544 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that "district courts typically
dispose of FOIA cases by summary judgment before the plaintiff can conduct discovery").
251 Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1126,
1131 (N.D. Cal. 2008); see also Raher v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 03:09-CV-00526-ST, 2011
WL 4832574, at *6 (D. Or. Oct. 12, 2011) ("Discovery is sparingly granted in FOIA cases and
only when an agency has not taken sufficient steps to find responsive documents") (citing
Lawyers' Committee, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 1131-32); Schulze v. FBI, No. 1:05-cv-00180, 2011 WL
129716, at *2 n.2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2011) (citing Lawyers' Committee for the proposition that
FOIA cases are typically decided on summary judgment without discovery).
252 Goland, 607 F.2d at 357 n.2 (Bazelon,J., dissenting).
253 Id. at 357.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 357 n.2.
256 Id. at 358.
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sometimes necessary because ordinary rules of discovery cannot be followed in FOIA cases where the issue is whether one party is entitled to
non-disclosed documents."257 The court, however, never explained why
the ordinary rules of discovery cannot be followed.
One rationale for restricting discovery seems facially appealing but
fails to withstand scrutiny. Courts have concluded that discovery in a
FOIA case is inappropriate because the litigation is solely about the release of records, and courts often assume any discovery would concern
the content of the requested records themselves.258 Requesting discovery of the very records that were sought originally under FOIA would
be an inappropriate use of discovery in a FOIA case, and there is no
serious suggestion to the contrary.25 9 Proper discovery requests in FOIA
cases, however, concern facts external to the records themselves, which
are nonetheless highly relevant to a given claim of exemption. For instance, discovery concerning how the records were created, what the
records' intended use was, and with whom the records were shared are
key inquiries in analyzing a claim that the deliberative process privilege
exempts records from disclosure. 26 0 Likewise, the amount of competition a company faces, the measures it uses to guard against release of
Minier v. CIA, 88 F.3d 796, 803 (9th Cir. 1996); see Wood v. FBI, 432 F.3d 78, 85 (2d
Cir. 2005) ("[D]iscovery relating to the agency's search and the exemptions it claims for
withholding records generally is unnecessary if the agency's submissions are adequate on
their face." (citation omitted)).
258 See City & Cnty. of Honolulu v. EPA, No. 08-00404, 2009 WL 973154 (D. Haw. Apr. 9,
2009).
259 Id. In City and County of Honolulu v. EPA, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Hawaii noted that discovery is limited in FOIA cases "because the underlying case revolves
around the propriety of revealing certain documents" and that it is doubly inappropriate
to grant discovery where the request "consist[s] of precisely what defendants maintain is
exempt from disclosure to plaintiff pursuant to the FOIA." Id. at *1 (citation omitted). In
another case, the Ninth Circuit noted, disapprovingly, that the plaintiff appeared to be
requesting in discovery "the very information that is the subject of the FOIA complaint."
Lane v. Dep't of the Interior, 523 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Simmons v. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, 796 F.2d 709, 712 (4th Cir. 1986) (denying discovery because it "appear[ed] largely to be an attempt to ... learn the contents of the requested documents");
Pollard v. FBI, 705 F.2d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 1983) (denying a deposition concerning the
contents of the withheld documents because the deposition would reveal precisely what
the defendants maintained was exempt from disclosure); Driggers v. United States, No.
3:11-CV-0229-N, 2011 WL 2883283, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 18, 2011) ("Here, Plaintiffs discovery seeks detailed information from the withheld records ... [and] would essentially
provide the relief he seeks through this lawsuit."); Schulze, 2011 WL 129716, at *3 (denying
discovery because "[p]laintiff's request relates to the very information that is the subject of
his FOIA complaint").
26 Kwoka, supra note 146, at 236-37; see also CoastalStates Gas, 617 F.2d at 868 (noting,
for example, that the identity of the parties to a memorandum is important in determining whether a record was predecisional or post-decisional).
2-7
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particular information, and who is given access to that information are
all relevant to an analysis of a claim that records are confidential commercial or financial information. 261 In fact, the majority of disputes of
fact in FOIA cases are disputes not about the contents of the records,
but about the circumstances surrounding them.2 62 Evidence concerning these facts would be appropriately subject to discovery and would
not reveal the content of the requested record.
Other courts have not gone as far as to ban discovery completely,
but have adopted a standard by which plaintiffs are unable to access the
tools of discovery at a normal stage in the litigation process and instead
are required to wait until after summary judgment, if the case survives
that long. These courts explain that because "[g]enerally, FOIA cases
should be handled on motions for summary judgment . ... [a] plaintiff's early attempt in litigation ... to take discovery depositions is inappropriate until the government has first had a chance to provide the
court with the information necessary to make a decision on the applicable exemptions." 263 This rule is particularly troubling because summary judgment is the presumptive method for resolution of a FOIA
case, with less than one percent of FOIA cases being resolved at trial.2 6
Thus, virtually no plaintiff will benefit from this potential opportunity
for discovery.
A final circumstance courts sometimes identify as warranting discovery is when a FOIA plaintiff can demonstrate the agency's bad
faith.265 By contrast, discovery is not warranted "when it appears that
discovery would only . . . afford [ ] [the plaintiff] an opportunity to pursue a 'bare hope of falling upon something that might impugn the affidavits."' 266 As Judge Bazelon pointed out, however, a plaintiff will likely
261See Kwoka, supra note 146, at 236-37.
262 Id.

263 Miscavige v. IRS, 2 F.3d 366, 369 (11th Cir. 1993); see Taylor v. Babbitt, 673 F. Supp. 2d
20, 23 (D.D.C. 2009) ("Postponing discovery until the government has submitted its dispositive motion and supporting documents allows the court to obtain information necessary to
appropriately limit the scope of discovery or forgo it entirely."); Murphy v. FBI, 490 F. Supp.
1134, 1137 (D.D.C. 1980) ("[A] factual issue that is properly the subject of discovery [in a
FOIA case] can arise only after the government files its affidavits and supporting memorandum of law.").
26 Kwoka, supra note 146, at 258 (calculating the percentage of FOIA trials during the
period between 1979 and 2008); see Miscavige, 2 F.3d at 369 ("Generally, FOIA cases should
be handled on motions for summary judgment, once the documents in issue are properly
identified."); infra notes 272-289 and accompanying text.
265 See Jones, 41 F.3d at 242.
266 Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 751-52 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (quoting Founding Church of Scientology v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 610 F.2d 824, 837 n.101 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
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have no way of demonstrating an agency's bad faith, or impugning the
affidavits, unless discovery is available. 267 Thus, this rule, too, places the
plaintiff in a classic catch-22.
In an ironic twist, one of the most prominent FOIA cases to allow
discovery was Weisberg v. Webster, in which the D.C. Circuit in 1984 permitted the government to use discovery to obtain information held by the
requester.268 Although "in the usual FOIA case, the government will be in
possession of all such evidence" concerning the adequacy of its own
search, the requester was a devoted researcher of the issues pertaining
to the request who, the court concluded, had greater knowledge of the
records than the government.26 9 If ever a discovery rule seemed lopsided, this case seems to have announced one. The court granted discovery to the government-defendant, not the requester-plaintiff. 270 Although unusual because discovery was granted, this case exemplifies the
norm in FOIA lawsuits: FOIA plaintiffs are almost uniformly unable to
access the tools of discovery to gather evidence that could support their
case or impeach the government's withholding claims.2 71
3. SummaryJudgment
Summary judgment is unusually central to the FOIA litigation
process. Under the Federal Rules, summary judgment in a civil case is
used to preview trial and resolve pure questions of law and cases with
no genuine disputes of material fact.272 If there is a dispute of fact that
may affect the outcome of the case, summary judgment is inappropriate and the case proceeds to trial.27 3
267 See

Goland, 607 F.2d at 357 (Bazelon,J., dissenting).
See Weisberg, 749 F.2d at 868.
269 Id. In this case, the plaintiff sought information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) regarding the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr. Id. at 856-66. The FBI complied and released over 200,000 pages of documents. Id. The plaintiff claimed that the FBI's search was inadequate, and the FBI sought
discovery as to the basis of these claims. Id. at 866. Noting that the plaintiff-requester had
spent twenty years researching these issues, the court concluded that it was "entirely possible that the individual members of the agency ... [were] not as astute or as knowledgeable
as to what they have in their files as the plaintiff-requester." Id. at 868.
270 See id.
271 See supra notes 243-271 and accompanying text.
272 See FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (a).
273 See id. Plaintiffs bringing cases under FOIA do not have a constitutional or statutory
right to a jury trial, and therefore these cases proceed to bench trial. See Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 169 (1981) (holding that the Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does not apply to claims against the United States because of sovereign immunity);
see also 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006) (lacking a statutory provision for jury trial).
268
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Courts have uniquely applied summary judgment in FOIA litigaAlmost uniformly, courts have declared that, "generally, FOIA
tion.
cases should be handled on motions for summary judgment, once the
documents in issue are properly identified" 275 or even that "[a]s a general rule, all FOIA determinations should be resolved on summary
judgment."2 7 6 The underlying assumption is that FOIA cases turn only
on legal questions, the only facts at issue being the contents of the requested records, which cannot be disputed, and thus that resolution at
the summary judgment stage is appropriate.27 7
This assumption is incorrect. The application of FOIA's exemptions turns on factual inquiries. For instance, Exemption 6 covers records the release of which would likely cause an "unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy."278 This determination requires predictive inquiries
as to, on the one hand, the effect of the release on an individual or
group of individuals, and, on the other hand, whether the release of
the records will contribute to the public's understanding of the operations and activities of the government.27 9 These inquiries require findings unrelated to the content of the records themselves, such as what
knowledge on the topic is already public and how a record might be
used for nefarious purposes. These facts are often in dispute in a FOIA
case. As a result, the assumption that summary judgment is an appropriate vehicle for resolving FOIA cases is unwarranted.
Instead of acknowledging these factual disputes and ordering trials, however, courts end up resolving factual disputes at the summary
27 4

24 See Kwoka, supra note 146, at 244-49 (describing the use of summary judgment in
FOIA cases).
275 Miscavige, 2 F.3d at 369; see Wickwire Gavin, P.C. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 356 F.3d 588,
591 (4th Cir. 2004) ("FOIA cases are generally resolved on summary judgment . . . .");
Cooper Cameron Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 280 F.3d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 2002) ("Summary judgment resolves most FOIA cases . . . ." (citing Miscavige); see also ACLU v. U.S.
Dep't of Defense, 628 F.3d 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ("If an agency's affidavit describes the
justifications for withholding the information with specific detail, demonstrates that the
information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption, and is not contradicted
by contrary evidence in the record or by evidence of the agency's bad faith, then summary
judgment is warranted on the basis of the affidavit alone.").
276 Lawyers' Committee, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1131 (emphasis added).
277 Kwoka, supra note 146, at 227.
278 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (6).
279 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (6), (7)(C) (2006); see U.S. Dep't ofJustice v Reporters Comm.
for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 756 (1989); see also Kwoka, supra note 146, at 22744 (providing a detailed analysis of the distinctions between factual and legal questions in
FOIA cases).
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judgment stage.280 Often, the weighing of evidence and resolution of
factual questions is evident in the summary judgment opinions themselves. 281 In addition, empirical evidence demonstrates that FOIA cases
are being treated differently from other civil cases. Because FOIA cases
may present myriad factual disputes, presumably they should result in
trials at a rate similar to other civil litigation. In reality, although the
trial rate in civil cases has been slowly falling-with trials occurring in
approximately 3% of civil cases-the trial rate in FOIA cases remains
far lower.2 82 In the years between 1979 and 2008, the trial rate in FOIA
cases averaged less than 1%, and in the last ten years, there have been
almost none.28 3 Additionally, about 12% of non-FOIA civil cases have
been resolved by motion, whereas about 38% of FOIA cases are resolved by motion. 284
The oddity of resolving factual disputes at the summary judgment
stage has not gone unnoticed by the courts of appeals. Although traditionally a summary judgment decision is reviewed de novo by a court of
appeals because it involves only questions of law, there is a split among
the circuits as to the appropriate standard of review for summary
judgment decisions in FOIA cases. 28 Six circuits maintain the de novo
standard,2 86 but five others have adopted varying articulations of a twotiered standard of review under which the court of appeals reviews the
district court's factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de

280 See Kwoka, supra note 146, at 238-40 (contending that in some FOIA cases, judges
decide factual disputes at the summary judgment stage); Rebecca Silver, Comment, Standard of Review in FOIA Appeals and the Misuse of SummaryJudgment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 731,
732 (2006) (same).
281 See, e.g., Access Reports v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 926 F.2d 1192, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(reasoning, under the deliberative process privilege, that although some evidence tended
to show that the requested report was post-decisional because it explained a legislative
proposal that was already adopted, other evidence demonstrated the report was prepared
to defend against anticipated public attacks, and concluding that the latter evidence was
more persuasive, and thus that the exemption applied).
282 Kwoka, supra note 146, at 256-60 (cataloging rates of FOIA trials over a thirty-year
period).
283 Id. at 258.
284
Id. at 260.
285 See id. at 261-64 (describing the split in detail); Silver, supra note 280, at 735-40
(same).
286 See, e.g., Wilner v. Nat'1 Sec. Agency, 592 F.3d 60, 69 (2d Cir. 2009); Mo. Coal. for
the Env't Found. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 542 F.3d 1204, 1209 (8th Cir. 2008); Forest
Guardians v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 416 F.3d 1173, 1177 (10th Cir. 2005); Assassination
Archives & Research Ctr. v. CIA, 334 F.3d 55, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Abraham & Rose, P.L.C.
v. United States, 138 F.3d 1075, 1078 (6th Cir. 1998); Church of Scientology Int'l v. U.S.
Dep't ofJustice, 30 F.3d 224, 228 (1st Cir. 1994).
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novo,287 essentially acknowledging that fact-finding occurs at the summary judgment stage in FOLA cases.
The effect of resolving questions of fact at the summary judgment
stage on the ability of FOIA plaintiffs to make their case is likely quite
significant. Trials provide the opportunity for lawyers to focus a court's
attention on the important points in a case in a way not often achievable in papers alone. Trials also provide the requester an opportunity
to cross-examine government witnesses and to test the truth of their
assertions, and provide a chance for meaningful discovery.28 Without
the chance to see a government witness and assess his or her credibility
under cross-examination, a district court is likely to view government
affidavits as virtually unassailable and accept the affidavits as credible
and true.2 89
4. Do-Overs
FOLA procedure also uniquely favors the government by giving it a
second bite at the apple when it fails to meet its burden in the initial
briefing. Typically, FOIA cases are decided not just on one party's motion for summary judgment, but on the government's and the requester's cross-motions for summary judgment. As described above,
courts have presumed that these motions are the appropriate vehicles
for resolving FOIA cases. 290 Deferential treatment to the government
occurs under two scenarios described in detail below.29 1 First, the government receives procedural deference when the court concludes that
neither motion should be granted, but rather than proceeding to trial,
gives the government extra time to marshal its case and an opportunity
to file a new motion for summary judgment.29 2 Second, the court defers to the government's position when the court concludes that the
287 See, e.g., Hunton & Williams v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 590 F.3d 272, 275-76 (4th Cir.
2010); Lane, 523 F.3d at 1135 (9th Cir.); News-Press v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 489
F.3d 1173, 1189 (11th Cir. 2007); Solar Sources, Inc. v. United States, 142 F.3d 1033, 1038
(7th Cir. 1998); McDonnell v'. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993). The Fifth
Circuit has not declared its position. See FlightSafety Servs. Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor,
326 F.3d 607, 610-11 & n.2 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
288 Kwoka, supra note 146, at 273-76 (interviewing attorneys who have conducted
FOIA trials). Empirical evidence, while scant, also suggests meaningful benefits to FOJA
plaintiffs from trial proceedings. Id. at 264-67.
289 See id. at 244-46; see alsojudicial Watch, Inc. v. Export-Import Bank, 108 F. Supp. 2d
19, 25 (D.D.C. 2000) (holding that "[o]nce a court determines [in a FOIA case] that the
[government's] affidavits are sufficient, no further inquiry into their veracity is required").
290 See supra notes 272-289 and accompanying text.
291 See infra notes 292-313 and accompanying text.
292 See infra notes 304-308 and accompanying text.
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government failed to meet its burden of producing sufficient evidence
from which the trier of fact could find in its favor on the claimed exemption, but gives the government leave to gather more evidence and
thereafter to file a new motion for summary judgment, rather than
granting summary judgment to the requester.293
To understand how these practices constitute deviations from typical litigation, consider first how a FOIA case would work if the normal
rules of procedure applied. To begin, the government bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that a FOIA exemption applies, and thus
to justify the withholding.2 94 Although it is highly unusual for a defendant to bear the burden at the summary judgment stage, Congress expressly allocated the burden to the defendant in FOIA cases. 295 As a
result, the government's task at the summary judgment stage should be
substantially more difficult than the plaintiffs. To win a motion for
summary judgment, a party who bears the burden of proof-here, the
government-must demonstrate evidence on every element of the
claim and that there is no genuine issue of material fact on any element
of the claim such that a trier of fact could only find in favor of the moving party. 296 Put another way, the party who does not bear the burden
of proof (the requester in a FOIA case) should defeat a summary
judgment motion simply by demonstrating some contrary evidence
such that there is a genuine issue of material fact that must be tried.2 97
By contrast, a party that does not bear the burden of proof may win his
or her own summary judgment motion merely by demonstrating a lack
of sufficient evidence to find for the defendant on a single essential
element of the claim.298
For instance, in the FOIA context, if the government were claiming that records were exempt under the deliberative process privilege
recognized under Exemption 5,299 it would have to demonstrate that
the records were (1) inter- or intra-agency; (2) predecisional; and (3)

29
29

See infra notes 309-313 and accompanying text.
See5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (B) (2006) ("[T]he burden is on the agency to sustain its ac-

tion.").
295

Id.
See Adam N. Steinman, The IrrepressibleMyth of Celotex: Reconsidering SummaryJudgment Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 81, 119-21 (2006); see also
FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (articulating the summary judgment standard).
29 See FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
298See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
296

- 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (5).
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deliberative. 00 If the plaintiff moves for summary judgment, points to
the Vaughn index, and explains how the Vaughn index provides a lack of
evidence that the records were deliberative, this should be sufficient to
prevail on summary judgment.3 0 1 On the other hand, if the government moves for summary judgment, it must demonstrate sufficient evidence in its Vaughn index on each of those three elements. 30 2 Even
then, the plaintiff could defeat the motion by producing enough evidence to create a genuine dispute on any single element.3 03
But cross-motions for summary judgment in FOIA cases do not
proceed this way. Instead, when a court concludes that the government
has failed to produce evidence to support an essential element of the
exemption claim, rather than grant the plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment, a court often denies both motions with an explicit option for
the government to refile with more evidence. 304 In one case, where the
court denied summary judgment to both parties on an Exemption 5
claim, the court ordered the agency to "submit a new Vaughn Index as
to these documents with proper detailed document descriptions and
reasons for withholding that illuminate the contents of the documents
and the reasons for nondisclosure."3 05 In another case, the court oddly
"partially granted" the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the
issue of the inadequate Vaughn index, but then denied both motions
for summary judgment on the exemption claims on the basis that the
court could not make a determination about the exemptions without
an adequate Vaughn index.3 06 These cases abound.30 7
300See Mink, 410 U.S. at 89. Although it is unusual to talk about "elements" of a FOIA
claim, as they typically are not defined as such, the components of a given exemption essentially function as elements because all or a certain number must be met for the exemption to apply.
301See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327.
302See id.
303See id.
304See infra note 307 (collecting cases).
305 Hornbeck Offshore Transp., LLC v. U.S. Coast Guard, No. Civ.A.04-1724(CKK),

2006 WL 696053, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2006).
306 Elec. Frontier Found. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 826 F. Supp. 2d. 157, 175 (D.D.C.
2011).
307See, e.g., Clemente v. FBI, 741 F. Supp. 2d 64, 89 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding the government's evidence inadequate, denying both parties' motions for summary judgment, and
ordering the government to file a more adequate Vaughn index); Schoenman v. FBI, 604 F
Supp. 2d 174, 204 (D.D.C. 2009) (denying both parties' motions for summary judgment and
ordering the government to produce a more specific Vaughn index); NYC Apparel FZE v.
U.S. Customs & Border Prot., No. Civ.A. 04-2105(RBW), 2006 WL 167833, at *36 (D.D.C. Jan.
23, 2006) (denying without prejudice the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, ordering the government to submit to the court a more specific Vaughn index and "any addi-
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It is difficult to imagine any other circumstance in which a court
would not grant summary judgment against a party which clearly failed
to meet its burden of production on an essential element of the claim.
District courts often have the discretion to allow a plaintiff to refile with
more or better evidence than she produced in the first round. 08 The
routinization of this practice, however, appears to be unique to FOIA
cases, and only benefits the government.
In one striking case, a requester challenged the Bureau of Prisons'
(BOP) invocation of Exemption 7, which covers certain law enforcement records.30 9 At the summary judgment stage, cross-motions contested whether BOP had met its burden to prove the threshold requirement to demonstrate that the records were compiled for law
enforcement purposes.3 10 The court explained that "[t]he BOP's supporting declaration neither identifies a particular individual or incident
subject to an investigation nor connects a particular individual or incident to a potential violation of law."311 As a result, BOP did not meet its
burden to produce evidence supporting the threshold requirement of
tional declarations" regarding the claimed exemptions, and thereby inviting renewed motions for summary judgment); Edmonds Inst. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 383 F. Supp. 2d
105, 111 (D.D.C. 2005) (finding that the agency's Vaughn index was not sufficiently detailed,
but that the requestor was not entitled to a declaratory judgment that the agency acted contrary to law, and ordering the government to submit a more specific Vaughn index after
which renewed motions for summary judgment would be considered); Queen v. Reno, No.
Civ.A. 96-1387(JAR), 2005 WL 762087, at *10 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2005) (denying both parties'
motions for summary judgment while ordering the government to produce a supplemental
Vaughn index and inviting the parties to renew their motions thereafter); Campaign for Responsible Transplantation v. FDA, 219 F. Supp. 2d 106, 116 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding the
agency's Vaughn indices inadequate and ordering the government to submit a more specific
index, after which renewed motions for summary judgment would be considered); Sousa v.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civ. Nos. 95-375, 95-410, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18627, at *32 (D.D.C.
Dec. 9, 1996) (denying both parties' motions for summary judgment, granting the government sixty days to submit an amended Vaughn index and any additional affidavits, and granting an additional thirty days to refile the motion for summaryjudgment).
30o To begin, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) only states that courts "shall" grant
summary judgment. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a). There is a dispute in the case law as to whether
the word "shall" gives district courts discretion to deny summary judgment when there
appears to be no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the rules committee has declined to change the word "shall" to the more clearly mandatory "must" that the new style
of rules drafting uses for fear of eliminating existing discretion. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56
committee's note (2010 amend.). Perhaps even more importantly, Rule 56(d) also permits
a court to defer ruling or deny a motion where a party demonstrates that there was insufficient opportunity to gather evidence. This situation is not likely directly applicable to the
government in a FOIA case, which chooses when to file the motion and controls the relevant evidence, but allowing refiling is likely within the district court's authority.
so9 Benavides v. Bureau of Prisons, 774 F. Supp. 2d 141, 145 (D.D.C. 2011).
30 Id. at 146.
s11 Id. at 147.
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Exemption 7.312 Rather than grant summary judgment to the plaintiff,
who won the contested issue, the court denied the plaintiffs motion
without any invitation to refile (although the opportunity was not yet
foreclosed by the scheduling order), and then, in denying that portion
of BOP's motion, specified that the denial was "without prejudice."3 13
Thus, in the court's view, only the government should get a second bite
at the apple.
The consequence of this practice is clear. The government need
not put its best foot forward in its first round of papers. If it fails to win
with its initial try, it will usually get another chance. If the usual summary judgment standard were applied, and the government's failure to
produce minimal evidence on an essential element was fatal, plaintiffs
would prevail much more often or the government would be forced to
put forth a meaningful showing of evidence the first time around.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF PROCEDURAL MANIPULATION

The spoken and unspoken deference practices discussed above are
problematic in and of their own right. Taken together, they defy the
will of Congress by distorting the standard of review it prescribed and
effectively endorsing greater government secrecy than was envisioned
under FOIA. 314 As one scholar has persuasively argued with respect to
extra deference afforded to the military under APA review, departing
from a congressionally chosen standard of review by the creation of
common law deference doctrines "is problematic on a deeper level
than a simple error of statutory interpretation; it represents the courts'
failure to respect the democratic process."315 At bottom, this poses a
fundamental separation of powers problem, with the judiciary failing to
give effect to the duly enacted laws of the Congress.3 16
The forms of "unspoken deference" catalogued in this Article have
especially troubling implications. As demonstrated, altering the typical
discovery processes, manipulating the summary judgment standard,
and allowing one litigant special privileges to rehabilitate failed motions all combine to give the government great advantages. At bottom,

312Id.
313Id.
314For a detailed and persuasive argument regarding the separation of powers implications of courts' departure from congressionally chosen standards of review, see Kovacs,
supra note 172, at 608.
315Id.
316Id
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these "unspoken deference" practices pose an even greater set of problems than the spoken deference doctrines in several important ways.
Most importantly, some of these entrenched procedural practices
may consciously or subconsciously have been made because of judges'
underlying views about the merits of FOIA as a transparency tool generally or the merits of the particular FOIA dispute before the court. That
at least some judges are not fond of FOIA disclosures is not a particularly well-kept secret.3 17 Indeed, some evidence of this fact can be found
empirically. Professor Paul Verkuil's analysis of FOIA outcomes included
an analysis of so-called reverse FOIA cases, cases in which a third party
sues the government to prevent release of records to a requester under
FOIA, typically by claiming that the records are trade secrets.3 18 Because
these cases are brought under the APA, the agency's decision to release
the records is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, a deferential standard
that would predict a higher affirmance rate than the affirmance rate for
FOIA cases. 319 Contrary to that prediction, Verkuil finds that the affirmance rate in reverse FOIA cases is significantly lower than in traditional FOIA cases.3 20 Thus, agencies' decisions to release documents are
overturned more often than their decisions not to disclose, which are
considered under a stricter standard. This finding, although hardly conclusive, nonetheless provides some evidence that judges more systematically defer to secrecy decisions under FOIA.
The obfuscation of substantive decision making through the manipulation of discretionary procedures has been rightly criticized in
other contexts. 32 1 One scholar has discussed the U.S. Supreme Court's
use of "substance disguised as process," in decisions concerning the
See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, REG., Mar.1982,
at 14, 15 (calling FOIA "the Taj Majal of the Doctrine of Unanticipated ConseApr.
quences, the Sistine Chapel of Cost-Benefit Analysis Ignored"); see also Patricia M. Wald,
Two Unsolved ConstitutionalProblems, 49 U. Prrr. L. REv. 753, 760-61 (1988) (urging meaningful judicial review, while acknowledging that review "often seems to be done in a perfunctory way" and that "(pirobing even a little into national security matters is not an easy
or a pleasant job").
318See Verkuil, supra note 10, at 717.
317

319 See id.
320 See id. at 717-18 (observing an affirmance rate of approximately eighty percent in

reverse FOIA cases).
321 Although I use the terms "substance" and "procedure" as if their meanings were
both distinct and obvious, I recognize that even the Supreme Court recognizes a significant grey zone between the two. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965); Jenny S.
Martinez, Process and Substance in the "War on Terror," 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1013, 1018-21
(2008) (collecting examples of grey areas between substance and procedure and describing the related scholarly debate).
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Guantanamo detainees. 32 2 In her categorization, "substance disguised
as process" cases are those in which procedural rulings are "motivated
by the desire to affect the substantive outcome of the case."323 This
scholar contends that the use of procedural dodges to avoid substantive
decisions concerning the propriety of torture and other war on terror
tactics secretly subverts substantive law by failing to address the merits
that motivate the decision. 324 As she observes, procedural law itself may
be "bent" along the way.325 Finally, she notes the lack of candor and
transparency this represents in the judiciary itself.326
Likewise, another scholar has strongly critiqued the discretionary
decisions made to effectuate substantive preferences in the criminal
justice system, especially when those substantive preferences subvert the
expressed will of the legislature.3 27 He reveals that politicians, the media, and the public enact changes to the criminal justice system, such as
sentencing reform, only to have prosecutors rely on discretionary decisions in the use of "low visibility procedures" to undermine these reforms.32 8 This scholar observes that using discretionary procedures to
affect substantive outcomes impairs legitimacy and trust in the criminal
justice system, clouds understanding of the substantive law, and prevents the public from meaningfully participating in reform.32 9
The same problems these scholars document in other contexts in
which procedural maneuvers hide substantive motivations are present
in FOIA cases. To the extent that the unspoken deference in FOIA
cases results from underlying views about the merits, it reflects a lack of
transparency in the judicial decision-making process itself because it
fails to give notice to the public and the parties of the grounds on
which the decision really rests. 330 In this way, the merits of the case or of
FOIA disclosure laws themselves will not be debated, reasoned, or explained, but rather procedural rulings will disguise the difficult issues. 331
22 Martinez, supra note 321, at 1090.
323 Id.
324 Id.
325

I-d.

326 Id.

at 1091-92.
Stephanos Bibas, Essay, Transparency and Participationin CriminalProcedure,81 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 911, 945-46 (2006).
327

s28

Id.

329 Id.

at 946-52.
Cf Martinez, supra note 321, at 1091 (arguing that using procedural rulings to
achieve substantive outcomes itself evidences a lack of transparency in the judicial process).
331 This can be likened to the accepted use of dismissals for lack of standing as a proxy
for a judgment on the merits. See id. at 1059 (citing examples in which district courts dis330
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In addition, a collection of procedural practices, particularly ones
that purport to apply the generic procedural rules or use case-by-case
discretion to depart from them, are unlikely to garner the attention or
effective response on the part of Congress or the public. When the Supreme Court decided EPA v. Mink in 1970 and eviscerated any effective
review of classification claims made under FOIA, Congress acted immediately to restore de novo judicial review.332 Yet when courts use unspoken deference to sanction government secrecy, it is less likely to provoke
a public debate about the merits of that deference or to prompt legislative responses. The effect of these practices is simply less clear in the aggregate than a ruling that reflects the substantive effect. Masking these
substantive motives with procedural rulings is, therefore, normatively
problematic.333

In addition to concerns about secret rulings on the merits of a
case, distortion of procedural practices in FOIA cases poses other concerns about judicial integrity. The Federal Rules are designed to be
trans-substantive-that is, with rare exceptions, the same rules apply to
all cases regardless of the case type.334 A central purpose of transsubstantivity is to create a sense of fairness to the parties and reliability
in the litigation system.335 When courts create special procedures for
missed for lack of standing a suit brought to challenge the National Security Agency's warrantless wiretapping program and a suit brought to challenge detention and rendition to
Syria); Dru Stevenson & Sonny Eckhart, Standing as Channeling in the AdministrativeAge, 53
B.C. L. REv. 1357, 1397-1400 (2012) (noting that courts may use standing rules to screen
cases as a method of docket management, thereby using standing rules as a proxy for the
merits). But see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between justiciability and Remedies-And
Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REv. 633, 634 (2006) (arguing that it is not
necessarily undesirable ifjudges' views of the merits influence dismissals based on justiciability).
332 EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 81 (1973), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub.
L. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974), as recognized in CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985); see supra
notes 94-105 and accompanying text.
3 See Martinez, supra note 321, at 1091 ("'Substance disguised as process' is also troubling from a normative perspective. When substantive issues are resolved under the guise
of procedural rulings, there is a lack of candor and analysis of the substantive issues."); see
also Fallon, supra note 331, at 634 (explaining that numerous scholars have argued that
"hidden judgments about what ought to happen at a later stage sometimes influence determinations one step earlier").
3 See FED. R. Crv. P. 1 ("These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts, except as stated in Rule 81."); Stephen N.
Subrin, Uniformity in ProceduralRules and the Attributes of a Sound ProceduralSystem: The Case
for Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79, 80 (1997) (defining trans-substantive to mean
that the same procedural rules are used for different types of cases, regardless of the substantive law being applied).
335 See Michael P. Allen, Life, Death, and Advocacy: Rules of Procedure in the Contested Endof-Life Case, 34 STETSON L. REV. 55, 100-01 (2005) (arguing that courts should follow neu-
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one substantive set of cases, these values are undermined because the
rules appear to reflect bias and a lack of predictability.33 6 Furthermore,
application of the same rules across case type, over time, tends to produce accurate results, whereas departures from the rules increase risk
of error in case outcomes. 33 7 Even more alarming, departing from
trans-substantivity to give the government greater deference than Congress provided in the statute can be seen as judges resolving cases on
political rather than legal grounds.3 38 This perception has serious implications for the public's confidence in the judiciary and view of the
judiciary's legitimacy.339 As one scholar put it, "once one starts debating
which procedures are best for which types of cases, it becomes obvious
that political decisions are being made."4 o
All deference to government positions under FOIA contradicts the
clear terms of the statute and Congress's express intent in providing for
de novo judicial review. Unspoken or procedural deference, however,
poses particularly troubling concerns vis-a-vis the role of the judiciary in
reviewing agency decisions to withhold records from the public.
V. RESTORING DE Novo REVIEW
Congress tried not once but twice to ensure de novo judicial review
to protect the public's right to access government information under
FOIA.3 41 AsJudge Patricia Wald said nearly twenty-five years ago,
If courts had to give traditional deference to agency interpretations of the FOIA, as they do in almost every other review of
agency action, the Act might have been suffocated in infancy.
At the least, the Act would not have occupied its present, ma34 2
jor role in our national lives and governance.

tral, generally applicable procedural rules in end-of-life cases to ensure fairness to the
parties).
336 Id. at 101.
3s7 Id.
3
See id. at 100, 103.
3
Judicial departure from the trans-substantive Federal Rules that apply has been
rightfully criticized in other contexts. See id. at 94 (arguing that judges inappropriately
"disregard or distort neutral, generally applicable procedural rules" in end-of-life cases
based on the underlying subject matter).
340 Subrin, supra note 247, at 384.
341 See supra notes 79-105 and accompanying text.
342 Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information Act: A Short Case Study in the Perils and
Paybacks of LegislatingDemocraticValues, 33 EMORY L.J. 649, 658 (1984) (footnote omitted).
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Yet, this deferential review is precisely where the courts have ended up,
without acknowledging as much. Although courts give lip service to
FOIA's de novo review provision, the ninety-percent affirmance rate for
agency decisions to withhold information under FOIA demonstrates
that the formal standard does not tell the whole story.3 4 3
A system of deference to agency secrecy has emerged, comprised
of circumstances where courts have ignored clear statutory language,
including express deference doctrines concerning particular exemption claims and a collection of unique procedural mechanisms in FOIA
cases that tilt the scale in the government's favor.3 " This deference system explains the observed affirmance rate.
Ideally, of course, courts would reform their own practices to conform to the trans-substantive procedural rules and would treat FOIA
cases in the same manner as other civil litigation. In addition, they
would reconsider their practices of spoken deference in light of FOIA's
statutory mandate.3 45 Courts have the power to revisit their assumptions
about the proper way to review an agency's decision to withhold information from the public and to conclude that their past practices, however long-standing, conflict with the statutory language and congressional intent.346
Nonetheless, we must recognize that these practices are deeply
entrenched in FOIA jurisprudence.3 4 7 It is therefore worth considering
strategies litigants in FOIA cases could employ to resist the system of
deference to the government's secrecy positions. First, requesters could
more often seek discovery and litigate their entitlement to it, rather
than assume its unavailability. Second, requesters faced with the government's motion for summary judgment should, in their cross-motion
and opposition, not limit themselves to arguing their own entitlement
for summary judgment. Rather, they should also argue in the alternative the inappropriateness of resolution at the summary judgment stage
by highlighting genuine disputes of material fact appropriately resolved
at trial. 348 Third, requesters should challenge the spoken deference
343 See supra notes 120-165 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 166-313 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 79-105 and accompanying text.
346 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) ("Stare decisis is not an inexorable
command; rather, it is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to
the latest decision." (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
s4 See supranotes 166-313 and accompanying text.
3
See Kwoka, supra note 146, at 273-76 (explaining the benefits of trials in FOIA
cases).
3
3
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doctrines whenever they arise as contrary to the statute and to congressional intent in enacting FOIA. These types of strategies may force
courts to view FOIA cases as they view other litigation and make rulings
more in line with mainstream procedural practices and with the statutory language.
Although litigants may be able to advance some of these causes,
ultimately, courts' deference to governmental secrecy may require a
political solution. Congress could approach this problem in several
ways. The first option is to attempt to clarify the de novo standard by
articulating specifically a nonexhaustive list of inquiries to which it applies, legislatively overruling the courts' spoken deference doctrines.
For instance, this legislation would specify that courts review de novo all
inquiries relevant to a claimed exemption, including but not limited to
the government's representations about the agency's decision-making
process, the potential national security harm that would result from the
release of records, and the law enforcement purpose for which records
were compiled.34 9 With specificity in the language of the statute about
de novo review applying to these questions, it would be difficult for the
existing spoken deference doctrines to stand.
Perhaps most importantly, Congress could undertake procedural
reform in FOIA cases. Although not common, Congress occasionally
does specify departures from the Federal Rules for particular substantive claims as a result of unique problems that arise in specific contexts.35 0 FOIA is an area with specialized litigation difficulties arising
from the information imbalance between the government and the requester and perhaps warrants a specialized procedural solution.35 1 One
reform that would greatly reduce the unspoken deference to the government's secrecy decisions includes guaranteeing the availability of
some minimal amount of discovery prior to summary judgment motions, such as one set of interrogatories and a single deposition. Giving
the requester the opportunity to examine a government official familiar with the records at issue would permit the requester to test genu3
See supra notes 168-223 and accompanying text (explaining the various areas in
which courts have announced formal, stated deference to a government position relevant
to a FOIA exemption).
350 See, e.g., Steven A. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform in Private Securities Litigation: Dealing with the Meritorious as Well as the Frivolous, 40 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 1055, 1071-72 (1999)
(describing Congress's decision, in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, to
depart in certain ways from the Federal Rules for securities claims, including special sanctions procedures and pleading requirements).
31 See supra notes 224-313 and accompanying text (describing unique challenges in
FOIA litigation).
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inely, and perhaps contest, the government's claims. 352 Another powerful procedural reform would be to allow the government a single opportunity for a summary judgment motion, requiring the court either
to grant summary judgment to the plaintiff if the government fails to
produce sufficient evidence to allow the trier of fact to find in its favor,
or to order the case to trial if there exists a genuine dispute of material
fact. Disallowing do-overs for the government would compel the government to put forth its best case the first time around, allow the court
to make a ruling based on the best available evidence, and shorten the
litigation process for all involved.353
CONCLUSION

Taken together, courts, litigants, and Congress should consider
their role in remedying the system of deference to secrecy. This system
of deference raises troubling questions about whether decision making
has suffered at the administrative level under FOIA in reaction to a lack
of meaningful judicial review. It also raises concerns that Congress's desire for a true judicial remedy for aggrieved requesters is not available in
practice. The courts in particular should consider the effect of using
procedural mechanisms to effectuate particular substantive outcomes:
hiding the nature of the decision-making process, preventing a meaningful political response, and creating distrust of the judiciary. These
serious concerns warrant consideration of FOIA reform for all involved.

3
3

See Kwoka, supra note 146, at 273-76.
See supra notes 290-313 and accompanying text.
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